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Abstract 
 
Tree plantations in developing countries are mostly driven by private sectors, mainly to increase 
forest cover and meet the timber demand. However, research studies on tree plantations in Laos, 
for instance, show that despite high profitability tree farmers and private companies face many 
challenges such as low timber quality, low timber selling price and slow plantation expansion. 
These challenges could be the result of slow policy improvement processes or the lack of basis on 
the justification of government intervention. This study uses a policy decision tool - a cost-benefit 
analysis to evaluate social costs and social benefits from private tree plantations by considering 
the market and non-market values. Among various non-market values from tree plantations, 
carbon sequestration is selected. The goal of this study is to demonstrate how the value of non-
market benefits can shape environmental policy in developing countries. Given data limitations, 
the study was conducted based on the best existing data possible, using a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. The benefits of carbon sequestration in monetary value are 
obtained. A dual-discounting approach was applied to discount future net benefits of market and 
non-market components to arrive at a present value. The result of the study can be used as a basis 
to accelerate government intervention for private tree plantation investments. It was found that 
the benefit value of carbon sequestration in 2020 dollars was estimated to be $472.8 million over 
30 years of tree plantation. This value can translate into the budget for government intervention to 
improve current tree plantation practices and regulations, increasing profitability for tree growers 
and eventually increasing tree planting in Laos. Further research to improve the results of this 
study is also discussed.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Although it is well known that trees provide natural sequestration that helps to remove carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere, it is unfortunate that this benefit to society is not taken into account 
in the evaluation of private investment. An example of tree plantation investments in Laos, or an 
official name - Lao’s People Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), shows that profits are the only 
indicator to decide whether the investment is economically efficient or not; economic efficiency 
means that total benefits are greater than total costs, which in turn means that net benefits are 
positive. An optimally efficient program has the highest net benefits. However, there are other 
benefits such as water resource protection, soil erosion protection, carbon sequestration, and other 
ecosystem services stemming from tree plantations, and this should affect the decision of private 
investors to plant more trees.  
 
Settings and unique characteristics of Lao PDR provide a suitable justification for this research 
study to take place. First, tree plantations are part of rural livelihoods where people plant trees to 
contribute to their financial security (Newby et al., 2014). Second, tree farmers face challenges; in 
particular, their selling prices are lower compared to other countries in the same region (Maraseni 
et al., 2018). Last but not least, to date, there is no study to explore the benefits to society 
stemming from tree plantations in Lao PDR, and how accounting for these missing benefits can 
justify the need for government intervention. This study aims to illustrate how the integration of 
social benefits can promote tree plantation investments in the country. Before we go into detail 
about the study, it is essential to be informed about the global concerns of carbon dioxide 
emissions.  
 
Carbon dioxide is one of the six greenhouse gases (GHG), and certainly the one causing the most 
global climate modification. The 2018 IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (SR15) 
reports that we are now in the era of climate change, warmer temperature, sea-level rise, 
shrinking Arctic ice, change of crop yields, and increased prevalence of the disease. Damage due 
to GHG emissions is unprecedented and affects all economic sectors across wide spectrums 
(Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). The Stern Review (2007) has estimated that at least 5% of the 
global GDP each year will be lost due to damage caused by climate change. With a range of risk 
and uncertainty taken into account, it can go up to 20%. Further, the damage is expected to 
increase over hundreds of years from now, affecting several future generations to come. This 
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requires aggressive actions with strong collaborations around the globe, including all countries 
without regard to economic size. 
 
Many small countries are climate-vulnerable, although their emission share is very minimal 
compared with the global GHG emissions. It is reported that 70% of the global GHG emissions in 
2016 are accounted for by the top ten emitters, including China, the U.S., and India (Ge & 
Friedrich, 2020). Most GHG emissions are from energy consumption in countries with large 
economic size, and the emissions in some countries have been decreasing while in others have 
been increasing (British Petroleum, 2019). Nevertheless, the small emitting countries shall also 
aim to maintain or reduce their emissions, ensuring their development toward the green economy. 
It is also a shared responsibility where each country takes its action locally for the global benefits. 
Thus, it requires a sound policy to involve all sectors to combat climate change together.   
 
In the case of Lao PDR, a study was done to estimate the impacts of climate change using a 
computable general equilibrium model. The results show that the impact on crop yields and 
commodity prices would decrease gross domestic product by 2.8%, which is equivalent to $80 
million in 2050 with the base year of 2004 (Kyophilavong & Takamatsu, 2011). There are also 
other damage categories, such as floods, droughts, and diseases. This is partly because the global 
emissions are increasing, and partly because the forest watershed system is being destroyed due 
to land-use change and logging.  
 
To recover the destroyed forest cover, the Lao Government allocated an area for tree plantations 
of 500,000 hectares (ha) in 2005 and an additional 700,000 ha in 2018, resulting in the plantation 
target of 1.2 million ha to be completed by 2030. Figure 1.1 shows forest cover from 1940 to 
2015 with forest cover target in 2020. The plantation target is a means to promote commercial 
tree plantations, aiming to increase forest cover as well as wood production.  
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Figure 1.1 Forest cover (%) and government policies from 1940 – 2020 (Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry [MAF], 2005; Ministry of Planning and Investment [MPI], 2011; Phimmavong et 
al., 2019) 
 
Nevertheless, the tree farmers in Lao PDR face many challenges, including low timber quality, 
low timber prices, high costs of plantations and transportation, and official and unofficial charges 
(Maraseni et al., 2018). Also, private companies have encountered resistance for plantation 
expansions among local communities (Phimmavong et al., 2019). Trees are also cut earlier than 
their optimal age, due to the impatience of owners who plant trees as part of their rural 
livelihoods. This implies that wood production is not maximized. The recent studies on financial 
returns for two tree species in Lao PDR, teak and eucalyptus, show high financial returns from 
timber selling compared to costs of plantations in present value terms (Maraseni et al., 2018; 
Phimmavong et al., 2019). This suggests that the plantation investments are profitable. However, 
the plantation expansion has been slowed, and wood production to meet the future demand is also 
uncertain. This indicates that the tree market is not operating efficiently. Solutions such as a 
collaborative investment model and a co-innovation mechanism are proposed (Maraseni et al., 
2018; Phimmavong et al., 2019). Therefore, it is the motivation of this research study to further 
look for ways to accelerate the economic need for government intervention. 
 
This research study uses the decision tool in policymaking called cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
together with the first equimarginal principle and the Pigouvian subsidy rule. This aims to 
70%
49% 47% 42% 40% 47%
70%
1940 1982 1992 2002 2010 2015 2020
The Forest Strategy to the year 2020 (MAF, 2005)
- restore forest cover to 70% by 2020
- plantation target of 500,000 ha
The 7th NSEDP 2011 - 2015 (MPI, 2011)
- restore forest cover to 65% by 2015 Increase plantation target 
to 1.2 million ha by 2030 
(MAF, 2018, as cited in 
Phimmavong et al., 2019)
2005
2011
2019
Target
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integrate additional benefits, such as social and environmental benefits and costs, into a more 
fully comprehensive financial analysis. While financial analysis shows the profitability of an 
investment, the CBA tool takes social welfare into consideration: trees provide net benefits to 
people. This CBA tool is used to promote sound policy by incorporating all costs and benefits, 
including financial and non-financial components, into the decision-making process. The first 
equirmarginal principle of economics and the Pigouvian subsidy rule are applied to identify the 
magnitude and rationale of government intervention in private investment. This research is 
unique to Lao PDR in that it internalizes social benefits into the decision-making process for the 
private investment. There are very few studies of this type anywhere in developing countries in 
Southeast Asia.  
 
The central aspect of CBA is that the result is in monetary terms, which is to say that the human-
use services provided by trees can be estimated in money. In tree plantations, there are two types 
of values; market and non-market values. Financial costs are market values, which can be easy to 
quantify using data from well-established markets. However, non-market values, such as benefits 
of soil erosion control, clean air, support of biodiversity, recreation, and carbon sequestration, are 
not currently tradable in a well-established market and require alternate methods to monetize. 
Non-market values in this study are based on conservative assumptions by only considering the 
main benefit, which is carbon sequestration. Also, while carbon sequestration provides global 
benefits; in this study the value of carbon sequestration is based on benefits provided to local and 
regional populations only, because per CBA the scope of a study should be attributed to a specific 
jurisdiction so that a policy can be made from the CBA result with roles of all concerned actors 
within the same jurisdiction are being determined.  
 
Another challenge is how to address the timing of costs and benefits. Costs of investment occur 
mostly in the present time, while benefits mostly occur in the future, often far into the future by 
decades or even centuries. Due to social preference for benefits now versus the future, inflation, 
and the risk associated with uncertainty, the values occurring at different times need to be 
adjusted per standard practices in CBA. Therefore, all values can be compared on a present value 
basis.  Furthermore, the magnitude of discounting the future can also represent equity across 
generations for a long-term investment, such as 100 years or more. The technical efficiency 
estimation is not the only consideration that makes a sound environmental policy but also the 
equity value-judgment angle. This study utilizes different literature to assign a social discount rate 
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to monetize streams of future benefits, from the mathematical estimation of Ramsey (1928) to the 
Stern Review (2007) based on value judgment in the monetization of benefits for future 
descendants. Conservative discounting is used in this study to ensure that the results are 
defensible.  
 
The study also acknowledges possible drawbacks. Given that primary data are unavailable, data 
are mainly obtained from existing literature. Thus, the accuracy highly depends on the quality of 
data from previous studies. It is important to interpret the results with caution. Nevertheless, the 
results of this study can be summarized into two key takeaways. 
 
1. The benefits of carbon sequestration, which accrue to society, can be used as the basis to 
justify the additional intervention aiming at the improvement of the market efficiency for 
the private investment; and  
2. Social preference and value judgment can influence the study results by either increasing 
or decreasing the social benefits, in return, affecting how much government intervention 
should be. 
 
Nonetheless, manipulating the technical elements of this study always results in a consistent 
outcome, which is that carbon sequestration yields positive net benefits to society under all 
scenarios. There is no exception to this finding. 
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The manuscript has five (5) chapters, including this chapter. Chapter 2 summarizes previous 
studies on applications of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) for tree plantations as well as other CBA-
related components such as market interest rates, discounting approaches, the social discount rate, 
and the social cost of carbon. Chapter 3 describes the study design to provide a context for CBA 
for tree plantation investment. Chapter 4 includes results and discussion of the specific CBA, 
given the best and most appropriate analytical analysis, with sensitivity analysis for uncertainty in 
the input data. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the research study with major conclusions 
highlighted and proposes possible research extensions following the completion of this study. The 
technical details, together with statistical analysis and formulas, are included in the Appendix. 
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2 Literature review 
 
Any investment requires an evaluation to compare different options and to make the optimal 
decision based on specific criteria. For public investment, maximizing social welfare is the 
primary goal, ensuring economic efficiency along with the equitable allocation of resources. 
However, when it comes to sustainability, where future generations are affected but cannot 
explicitly represent themselves in today’s decisions, efficiency is not a sufficient criterion 
(Tietenberg & Lewis, 2018, p. 478). This section provides a review of cost-benefit analysis and 
its application specifically to the plantation sector. The distinctions of financial returns and 
economic benefits, characterizations of the economic benefits, as well as values of greenhouse 
gas emissions avoided in monetary terms, are also examined and incorporated. The selection of 
the social discount rate is summarized from prominent literature; there is some controversy and a 
healthy debate in the literature in selecting the appropriate rate of time preference for a 
developing nation such as Lao PDR. This section provides readers with the foundation of 
economics and its link to developing good environmental policy for all parties (as opposed to a 
study only of private investment that affects few). Dollar values otherwise specified, both 
estimated in this study and cited from other studies, are reported in the year 2020. 
 
2.1 Investment evaluation tool 
 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a tool to find out whether the benefits of a project investment are 
higher than its costs in present value terms. Public investment often uses CBA to quantify all 
benefits and costs from both market and non-market values in monetary terms. Market values 
represent explicit cash flow such as costs and incomes; non-market values, while possibly 
substantive, cannot be determined in a traditional and well-established market. Non-market value 
is often implicit but vital to society, such as clean air and water, the natural filtration of wetlands 
and forests, and, to be sure, values associated with slowing and possibly reversing climate 
modification from carbon emissions.  
 
In the private sector, financial analysis is mainly used to estimate financial returns on investment. 
This specifically includes only actual private costs and private benefits (or revenues) of an 
investment with no considerations of social costs and social benefits. In contrast, social costs and 
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benefits are often the result of externalities, which are spillover effects affecting a third party, 
often society at large. For example, pollution from an industry affects the water quality of a 
downstream community. The integration of social values into financial analysis for the private 
sector is made possible with government intervention.  
 
A comprehensive CBA requires including all market and non-market values that are estimable. 
These values can accrue at different times. To compare these values, it is necessary to convert 
them into present terms by discounting all future values and summing them together to arrive at 
the net present value (NPV). The main components of the conventional CBA include costs, 
benefits, interest rates, social discount rates, net present value, and a sensitivity analysis. An 
investment is efficient when its NPV is positive. However, negative NPV does not necessarily 
indicate a project should not be undertaken, particularly when an investment is to avoid 
catastrophe or risk to life, such as toxic pollutants, or when potentially large categories of benefits 
are excluded. Estimating the costs of the program using engineering data is typically easier to 
estimate than program benefits, especially if non-market categories are relevant.  
 
Examples of some studies done for tree plantations in Asia region include Niskanen (1998) in 
Thailand,  James & Francisco (2015) in Cambodia. Manivong & Cramb (2008), Maraseni et al. 
(2018), Phimmavong (2004), and Phimmavong et al. (2019) for private plantations in Lao PDR. 
However, a CBA of private investment in the region is limited at best and generally unavailable. 
It can be assumed that non-market values or social values external to private market transactions 
might be neglected or completely ignored from a benefit side for private investment. 
 
Nevertheless, the results of the financial analysis of tree plantations in the region, which is not the 
same as CBA, show a positive net present value, even in the absence of non-market values. The 
integration of non-market values for the decision-making process is meaningful when dealing 
with a public investment. For example, a UK study by Kula & Evans (2011) shows that non-
market values can help to justify the need for a public afforestation investment. This is made 
possible through the estimation of total economic value (TEV) which represents all values of 
environmental resources in monetary terms, including both market and non-market values. A 
detailed explanation is presented in the following section. 
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2.2 Characterization of costs and benefits of tree plantations 
 
The first step in CBA is to characterize the costs and benefits of investment. There are three cost 
components. First, there are straightforward engineering expenses due to a project investment in 
addition to operation and management expenses. Second, there are opportunity costs, which are 
the foregone implicit benefits from another program that is not done because the program chosen 
yields higher net benefits. The opportunity costs are relevant when there are choices to be 
selected from, for instance, to either plant trees or to produce crops, but not both. Last, it is a cost 
due to adverse environmental impacts. Economists refer to this type of cost as negative 
externalities.  
 
The benefits of investment, in environmental economics, refer to the total economic value (TEV). 
There are two main components in TEV of environmental resources which are active use value 
and passive use value (Cubbage et al., 2013). Active use value is comprised of direct use, indirect 
use and option value, while passive use value comprises existence value and bequest value. For 
an evaluation of project investment, direct use value is often included, because the benefit of 
direct use value can be easily derived by people who get benefits from a natural resource, for 
instance, timber. Meanwhile, other types of economic values are vital but less tangible, such as 
the value of fresh air, and require a method to valuing them. An investment that enhances 
economic values, particularly lesser tangible economic values, creates positive externality. The 
following paragraph describes each component of economic values. 
 
Direct-use values are benefits from the active use of an ecosystem. It is further distinguished into 
consumptive (or extractive, such as timber) and non-consumptive (or non-extractive, such as 
recreation activities). Indirect-use values are benefits from ecosystems without direct interaction, 
such as water purification and carbon sequestration. Indirect services are usually pathways to 
active use services and values. Option values are benefits derived from the option to directly or 
indirectly use resource services in the future. People may not want to use it today but still want to 
preserve their option to use it in the future. The last is passive use or non-use values, which are 
values society places on the existing ecosystem but do not use the resource. There are two types 
of non-use values: existence value and bequest value. Both represent different forms of altruism. 
Existence value occurs when society is not interested in human uses at all but feels satisfaction 
from just knowing that ecological health services exist for the benefit of nature (Krutilla, 1967). 
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Because passive values are not associated with any behavior and must be obtained as stated 
preferences, this value category – and particular the associated monetization – is the most 
controversial and subject to validity concerns (Carson et al., 2001).   
  
In climate change, a loss of active use value of environmental resources alone can cause 
substantial economic damage disproportionately distributed in a global context. The Working 
Group II of the IPCC, who deal with climate impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability, released 
results of observed impacts in natural and human systems in the IPCC Special Report on Global 
Warming of 1.5°C. Further, climate change can result in a global impact with a greater magnitude 
far into the future resulting from today's GHG emissions. Therefore, regardless of the controversy 
of passive-use values, it is essential to try to include them, or at least acknowledge them, in the 
total economic value. This is dealt with in detail in section 2.4. 
 
To define what should be included in the total economic value, we should understand how 
economic value is derived from ecosystem functions. de Groot (1992) defines ecosystem 
functions as ‘The capacity of natural processes and components to provide goods and services 
that satisfy human needs, directly or indirectly.’ The distinction between ecosystem functions and 
ecosystem goods and services is that ecosystem functions always exist, while ecosystem goods 
and services are only recognized when people get benefits. Costanza et al. (1997) further define 
that ‘Ecosystem goods (such as food) and services (such as waste assimilation) represent the 
benefits human population derives, directly or indirectly, from ecosystem functions.’ The authors 
also note that the term ‘ecosystem services’ is to refer to all benefits stemming from ecosystems, 
including goods.  
  
Based on the widely-cited Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005), the ecosystem services that 
affect human well-being are classified into four primary categories, including provisioning, 
regulating, information (or cultural services), and habitat functions (or supporting services) (Reid 
et al., 2005). Table 2.1 summarizes categories of ecosystem services with associated components 
of plantation forests. This shows that provisioning and cultural services have direct use values 
while regulating and maintenance services, such as carbon sequestration, soil and water 
regulations, have indirect use values. All of these services may have non-use analogs. 
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Table 2.1 Categories of ecosystem services and associated components of total economic value 
Ecosystem services Components of total economic value 
Section Division Use values Passive-use values 
Direct 
use 
Indirect 
use 
Option 
use 
Existence Bequest 
Provisioning Nutrition      
Materials      
Energy      
Regulating 
and 
maintenance 
Mediation of waste, 
toxins and other 
nuisances 
     
Mediation of flows      
Maintenance of physical, 
chemical and biological 
conditions 
     
Cultural Physical and intellectual 
interactions with 
ecosystem 
     
Spiritual, symbolic and 
other interactions with 
ecosystem  
     
Supporting Habitat for resident 
plants and animals and 
migratory species 
     
Source: modified from Masiero et al. (2019) and de Groot & van der Meer (2010). 
 
In the case of tree plantations, which are human-made forests for wood production, the ecosystem 
services provided from the investment are presumably lesser than that of natural forests. de Groot 
& van der Meer (2010) summarize the difference in the provision of goods and services between 
natural forests and plantations, as shown in Table 2.2. It can be seen that some goods and services 
such as food, fodder and fertilizer and natural hazard regulation provided by plantations remain 
the same as natural forests, while other services are mostly reduced. The limited ecosystem 
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services from tree plantations can also be explained by monocultural practices (only selected 
species being planted), in which biodiversity is completely lost.  
 
Table 2.2 The provision of goods and services of natural forests and plantations 
Main 
categories 
Goods and services provided by forests Natural 
forests 
Tree 
plantations 
Provisioning  Food  0 
 Raw materials  + 
 Energy resources  + 
 Fodder and fertilizer  0 
 Genetic resources  - 
 Natural medicines and pharmaceuticals  - 
 Biochemicals (non-medicinal)  - 
 Ornamental resources  - 
Regulating  Air quality regulation  - 
 Climate regulation  - 
 Water quality regulation  - 
 Water regulation  - 
 Natural hazard regulation  0 
 Erosion prevention  - 
 Maintenance and restoration or productive soil  - 
 Biological control  - 
 Pollination  - 
Cultural Aesthetic information  - 
 Recreation and nature-based tourism  - 
 Cultural heritage and identity  - 
 Inspiration  - 
 Spiritual and religious information  - 
 Educational information  -- 
 Science  -- 
Supporting Refugium  --- 
 Nursery  ? 
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+/0/– indicates a difference in services-provision between natural and plantation forest (“+” 
means service is enhanced, “0” means remains the same, “-”, “- - ”, “- - - ” means service is 
reduced in a progressively greater magnitude, and “?” means unknown). 
 
In a simple classification, the total economic value can be categorized into two types based on 
whether it can be readily bought and sold in a market or not. The two types of values are market 
and non-market values. Market values are tradable values for which data on prices are readily 
obtained. Goods and services under the provisioning service category are mainly market values 
such as food, raw materials, and energy resources. For tree plantations, the major economic value 
is derived from timber harvesting, which is an example of market value and can be estimated by 
the financial analysis for tree plantations using the costs of plantations and incomes from selling 
timber.  
 
In contrast, non-market values are values people place on natural resources and environment that 
cannot be purchased in a well-established market. Many studies monetize non-market values for 
forests where some degree of diversity remains intact (Costanza et al., 1997; de Groot & van der 
Meer, 2010, p. 32). For Asia, Guo et al. (2001) conducted a study in China to estimate economic 
value for water and soil conservation for natural forests, using simulation models and geographic 
information systems (GIS). The results show that water and soil conservation values were $130 
and $766, respectively, per hectare per year in 20201, while carbon sequestration accounts for 
8.8% of the total indirect economic (non-market) value of natural forests. Caution should be used 
when applying economic values from other studies. For example, economic values of water and 
soil conservation are highly site-specific depending on topographical location and the proximity 
to water resources. Also, the economic values from Guo et al. (2001) were derived for forest 
protection, which is mainly non-market value, while tree plantations are aimed for timber 
production with a rotation harvest. For a conservative estimate of non-use value, this study 
considers only the benefits of carbon sequestration.  
  
                                                     
1 Using the exchange rate is CNY 7.1 = $1 in 2020 and the Chinese CPI inflation rate of 1.96% for the year 
1997 – 2019 from World Bank (2020) to convert all monetary value into the current US dollars. 
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2.3 Values of the greenhouse gas emission reduction 
 
Carbon sequestration is a non-market value from forest and plantations. The value is derived from 
the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Climate change has been extensively shown 
to be linked to an increase in greenhouse gas (or carbon dioxide equivalent) concentration in the 
atmosphere, resulting in raising the average global temperature, causing physical damage to 
society. Some regions may gain benefits through increasing crop yields (Cosentino et al., 2012; 
Tian et al., 2012; and Zhao et al., 2017), and energy-saving for heating (Gonseth et al., 2017) 
particularly in the upper northern hemisphere. However, the cost pertaining to the temperature 
rise will be outweighed by such benefits in the long run if there is no intervention (Walthall et al., 
2012). Environmental policy by internalizing carbon externalities into the decision-making 
process became a priority for most countries around the world through international agreements 
such as the recent Paris Agreement in 2016. To address the benefits of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission reductions in CBA, putting a monetary value on GHG emissions is needed.  
 
Methods for economic valuation of environmental and resource values (including carbon 
sequestration) are classified into two broad categories; stated-preference and revealed-preference 
approaches (Tietenberg & Lewis, 2018, p. 78). Stated-preference approaches use survey 
techniques to ask people directly how much they are willing to pay for a marginal change in 
environmental quality. Revealed-preference approaches use behavior observation techniques. The 
latter is widely used for forest recreation by estimating the costs of accessing an environmental 
resource. This method is mainly linked to human behavior and uses the costs of traveling as a 
proxy for market prices. Therefore, it cannot estimate non-use values (Hanley & Barbier, 2009).  
 
In the case of non-use value such as GHG emission removal, contingent valuation method 
(CVM), which is one of stated-preference approaches, is mostly used to estimate willingness to 
pay (WTP) through a survey for an additional avoidance of damage due to GHG emissions. A 
key to a successful WTP survey is to have credible information with defensible results if 
implementing a project. However, the anthropocentric WTP survey has its drawbacks; notably, 
respondents are mostly subject to their knowledge, perception of issues, occupations, stated 
political orientation and incomes (Haile & Slangen, 2009; Kotchen et al., 2013; Solecki, 1998; 
Weber & Stewart, 2009; Winden et al., 2018). More importantly, the damage due to climate 
change is a global phenomenon. Emissions from one place result in damage in other types of 
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economic values (i.e., food sources), damage in another place, possibly in another part of the 
world. In other words, it is highly probable that the use value for one group of people is a passive-
use value for another group of people. Therefore, it is challenging to elicit the value of protecting 
the environment from GHG emissions through WTP studies, given that these different types of 
benefits are vary depending on who is being surveyed. 
 
Some studies try to capture the total economic value using CVM for climate change policy. 
Americans are willing to pay $71 per household per year2 for ten (10) years to reduce US 
emissions of 17% by 2020 (Kotchen et al., 2013), and the results do not vary much among the 
policy instruments of a cap-and-trade program, a carbon tax, or a GHG regulation. The recent 
WTP study by the same lead author shows that Americans are willing to pay $190 per household 
per year3 to support carbon tax (Kotchen et al., 2017). The substantial difference in WTP results 
between the studies might be due to the design of the survey where a preference for spending 
potential carbon tax revenue was added to the latter survey, raising relevancy to people’s welfare.  
 
Despite a possible debate on response bias, stated-preference surveys are the only type of method 
to estimate total economic value, and techniques are widely used in regulatory impact analysis 
and to evaluate public opinion (Arrow et al., 1993; Johnston et al., 2017). Unfortunately, very few 
WTP studies to estimate the economic value of GHG emission reduction exist. More importantly, 
GHG emissions are a global issue that require a global effort to reduce the risk of damage. 
Therefore, a different approach was developed to elicit the global economic value of carbon 
dioxide, which is known as the social cost of carbon.  
 
In economics, to elicit appropriate efforts for emission reductions, a marginal abatement cost 
should be equal to a marginal benefit of the reduction (Hanley & Barbier, 2009). A marginal 
abatement cost or a marginal cost of GHG mitigations is the additional cost of reducing additional 
emissions. In contrast, a marginal benefit or a marginal cost of GHG emissions is the additional 
benefit of damage avoided due to additional GHG emission reduction (see Figure 2.1). The 
                                                     
2 The study was done for survey data from 2010 and 2011. The result was estimated at $60 per household 
per year. By adjusting with an inflation rate of 1.7% for the U.S between 2010 – 2019 (World Bank, 
2020b), the WTP in 2020 is $60*(1+0.017)2020-2010 or $71. 
3 The survey was in 2016 with the result of $177 per household per year. Using an inflation rate of 1.9% for 
the US between 2016 – 2019 (World Bank, 2020b), the WTP in 2020 is $177*(1+0.019)2020-2016 = $190 
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quantity at equilibrium becomes a reduction target, and the price at equilibrium is used for 
climate policies such as carbon pricing.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual overview of one period cost-benefit analysis (CBA) applied to the problem 
of optimal carbon emissions policy and relationship to the social cost of carbon (SCC) (Weyant, 
2014). 
 
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is defined as an estimate of the potential economic damage due 
to emitting one additional ton of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere in present value (Anthoff 
et al., 2009a, 2009b; Nordhaus, 2008). This is a first-order estimate of the Pigouvian tax 
necessary for carbon dioxide emissions to reach an efficient level of pollution control (Tol, 2008). 
The SCC is thus a marginal damage cost used in CBA for climate policies. When a policy 
decreases GHG emissions, it is then considered to be the benefit of the policy. The main feature 
of the SCC is the assumption that all damage as the consequence of the increased GHG emissions 
is captured by the SCC. This is known as the “shadow price,” a monetary value assigned to an 
abstract commodity with an absence of correct market prices, that is placed on GHG emissions 
when evaluating the costs and benefits of climate policies (Newbold et al., 2010).  
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The SCC is estimated based on several assumptions to project future damage due to an additional 
ton of GHG emissions. The most cited estimation methods are integrated assessment models 
(IAMs). IAMs are generally comprised of modules; socioeconomic, climate, physical impact, and 
economic damage modules. Given the update on socioeconomic scenarios, modified climate 
functions, and damage functions, the SCC has also been updated from time to time. Some studies 
that are used to do this include Nordhaus (2017), Pindyck (2019), and Tol (2019). Steps to 
estimate the SCC using IAMs are as follows:  
 
1. Estimate emission trajectories of CO2 and other GHGs based on socioeconomic 
(population and GDP) trajectories 
2. Model climate impacts due to GHGs using climate models 
3. Project physical impacts in different sectors (i.e., sea-level rise and agriculture) 
4. Translate environmental impacts into economic damage (i.e., relative to GDP) 
5. Discount the future damage to arrive at the present value. 
 
Among the groundbreaking work in developing estimates of the SCC, the Interagency Working 
Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (IWG) under the Obama administration updated 
the SCC values using IAMs to $12, $42, and $62 per tCO2 for emissions in 2020 for 5%, 3%, and 
2.5% discount rates, respectively (Interagency Working Group, 2016). Using IAMs, the marginal 
damage cost or the SCC should be theoretically at the equilibrium (i.e., where the marginal 
abatement cost curve intersects with the marginal benefit of abatement curve). A country may 
decide to increase or decrease its efforts by setting its SCC higher or lower than the optimal point. 
Also, the SCC should be increasing over time due to future emissions  expected to cause more 
economic damage, increasing atmospheric carbon stock, and adaptation becomes more costly in 
response to more significant climate change damage (Environmental Project Agency, 2017). 
 
It is noted that carbon dioxide is classified as a fund pollutant (Tietenberg & Lewis, 2018, p. 336) 
because it can be absorbed by plant life and the oceans. However, current emissions greatly 
exceed the assimilative capacity of the environment. The damage can persist and be passed on to 
future generations. This persistence is a characteristic of stock pollutants. Therefore, carbon 
dioxide is typically regarded as a stock pollutant, and, thus justifies an increase of the SCC over 
time to further discourage future emissions.  
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In the global context, Tol (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of over 200 estimates of the SCC 
from 47 studies. The results show that the SCC estimate is at $6.3/tCO2 on average in 1995. A 
recent meta-analysis of 58 studies by Wang et al. (2019) shows the higher results. The estimated 
SCC ranges from $ -13.36 to $2,386/tCO2 with a mean value of $54.7/tCO2 from different years 
of publication; or equals to $30.78/tCO2 with a pure rate of time preference at 3% in peer-
reviewed studies. Wang et al. (2019) also highlighted that the newer publication year has a higher 
SCC estimate by order of magnitude.  
 
The estimation of SCC following the IAM procedure was recently done by Ricke et al. (2018). 
The result shows a high global SCC with a mean value of $417/tCO2 using a pure rate of time 
preference of 2% and a risk aversion of 1.5 (explanations on the pure rate of time preference and 
the risk aversion is in Section 2.4). This contradicts a recent study done by Tol (2019), where the 
global SCC estimate is much lower ranging from $4 to $15/tCO2, with the average of $6.5/tCO2, 
using a 1% pure rate of time preference and a risk aversion of 1.0. Further, Ricke et al. (2018) and 
Tol (2019) also provided results of the estimation of the country-level SCC by calibrating from 
the global SCC; the estimation uses recent climate model projections, economic damage 
estimates, and socioeconomic projections for different regions. Results of the country-level SCC 
from Ricke et al. (2018) show that India, the US and Saudi Arabia are the top three countries with 
the highest SCC estimates of $86/tCO2, $48/tCO2, and $47/tCO2, respectively. The result is much 
higher than of Tol (2019) in which India, China, and Ethiopia are the top three countries with the 
highest SCC estimates of $1.6/tCO2, $0.83/tCO2, and $0.32/tCO2, respectively. The EU and the 
US have the SCC estimates as small as $0.09 and $0.04/tCO2, respectively (Tol, 2019). Using 
different approaches produces results that vary widely.  
 
The SCC faces several criticisms such as a lack of human adaptation to climate change, 
exaggeration of the potential impacts of climate change, lack of probabilities in future emission 
scenarios, extremely low discount rate, and so on (Idso et al., 2019). According to the Working 
Group II of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), the main issue of SCC estimates is the high 
uncertainty due to the uncertainty in underlying total damage estimates, future emissions, future 
climate change, vulnerability, and evaluation as well as disagreement about how to aggregate 
impacts over time, regions and states of the world. A recent discussion of limitations and 
drawbacks of SCC from IAMs are summarized in Idso et al. (2019). 
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Nevertheless, despite the dispersion in SCC estimates among researchers, many economists agree 
that the value of the SCC is still needed when conducting CBA for climate policies. The SSC can 
be assigned either by actual estimations, empirical studies, meta-analysis, benefits transfer, or 
value judgment to ensure that benefits of GHG emission mitigations or costs of GHG emissions 
do not equal zero.  
 
2.4 Discounting the future: sustainability over very long periods 
 
Previous sections show that to address issues on inter- and intra-temporal equity in CBA, the 
selection of social discount rates is essential. More importantly, the studies related to discounting 
costs or benefits for the far future, i.e., SCC derived from the future economic damage of 200 
years or more, are highly sensitive to this social discount rate too. Using the 5% discount rate, the 
SCC was estimated at $12, while using a lower discount rate of 2.5%, the SCC can go up to $62 
(Interagency Working Group, 2016). This section defines the social discount rate, methods to 
estimate the value, criteria used to select components of the social discount rate, and how to 
address uncertainty for a long-term investment. 
 
Money received today is often preferable to money received in the future: people are impatient, 
and time involves risk. Hence, a $100 bill today is more valuable than a $100 bill in the future. 
The difference in value of money from different periods is accounted for by discounting. This 
concept of discounting is applied in cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to compare values of costs and 
benefits occurring at different times. In other words, it is done by all future costs and benefits are 
discounted to the present value. The sum of all present values, which is known as the total present 
value, is used in CBA to consider whether an investment or environmental project is efficient or 
not.  
 
Besides the time preference of human beings, society also believes that the future generation will 
be wealthier and have access to better technology and a better standard of living; therefore, 
discounting the future is considered appropriate to “level the playing field” across generations 
(Ramsey, 1928; Spackman, 2004). Public investment has a short, medium, and long term and 
tends to involve people from different periods: today and the future. To be specific, society today 
will bear the costs of public investment while benefits are received by society in the future. 
Hence, there is a specific name for this type of discount rate in economics; it is known as the 
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social discount rate. However, it should be noted that evaluating an investment from the private 
sector, to maximize financial returns, uses a market interest rate for discounting.  
 
The social discount rate and the market interest rate are not the same, although in discounting 
calculations, the mathematical machinations may look similar. Typically, the interest rate in 
private markets for capital is much higher than the social discount rate for social investments, 
such as environmental projects, mainly because the risk of loss to the individual is greater than 
the risk to society at large (consider, for example, an individual’s expected loss associated with 
cancer as compared to the health insurance company’s loss, where the latter predicts mortality 
rates using actuarial tables). Also, using a social discount rate of more than a couple percentage 
points will drive values in the distant future down to virtually nothing, which is tantamount to 
ignoring the needs of our descendants – that in itself is inconsistent with altruistic characteristics 
of human societies.   
 
The social discount rate (SDR) has been used in many applied economic contexts. For instance, 
the determination of the depletion rate of non-renewable resources by Hotelling (1931) and 
Solow (1947), finding an optimal rate of national savings by Ramsey (1928), and estimating 
social opportunity cost of public investment by Marglin (1963). The most popular approach used 
among welfare economists to estimate the social discount rate is the social rate of time preference 
(SRTP) (Arrow & Kurz, 1970; Feldstein, 1964). The SRTP theoretically is derived from a social 
welfare function, based on the work of Ramsey (1928). The notion is that policymakers should 
consider maximizing a social welfare function, which equals the present value of current and 
future utilities from consumption. In other words, a social welfare function is derived from a 
utility function which represents social preferences on consumption over a time horizon. In 
economics, “utility of consumption” is a term used to describe satisfaction from consumption, 
and it reduces with additional consumption.   
 
Examples of research studies and CBA guidelines using the SRTP include the UK Green Book 
(2018), Moore & Vining (2018), Harrison (2010), and Hanley & Barbier (2009), to name a few. 
The SRTP quantifies the weight that society puts on present and future consumption flows. The 
SRTP using Ramsey’s equation is shown as follows: 
 
 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝜌𝜌 + 𝑒𝑒 ∗ 𝑔𝑔 Eq. (1) 
 
21 
where SRTP is the social rate of time preference to estimate the social discount rate, 𝜌𝜌 is the pure 
time preference rate, e is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, and 𝑔𝑔 is the growth 
rate of per capita consumption. The pure time preference rate reflects the impatience of society by 
discounting the utility of future generations, while 𝑒𝑒 ∗ 𝑔𝑔 represents the wealth effect. The pure 
time preference rate mostly refers to catastrophic risk, with the implication that society may not 
be able to enjoy consumption. Many economists including Arrow (1999), Evans & Sezer (2004), 
Kula (1985, 1987), and Pearce & Ulph (1999) suggest the use of a pure time preference rate of 
1% to 2.2% to reflect the risk of death due to climate change. However, the widely cited Stern 
Review justifies the use of 0.1% for a pure time preference rate per year with a consideration of 
the probability of human race extinction (Stern, 2007). The selection of the pure time preference 
rate corroborates the earlier discussion that the SRTP is greater than the interest rates in capital 
markets with individual transactions. 
 
The elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption represents to a percent change in utility 
compared with a percent change of consumption. The term “utility” has a specific meaning in 
economics. Utility refers to the amount of satisfaction a person gets from consumption of a 
certain good and service. Utility can also be monetized by a means of valuing market and non-
market values of human-use services. Therefore, utility functions are used to derive willingness to 
pay. Utility can be expressed in a total and marginal amount. Total utility means total satisfaction 
or benefit obtained from consumption of goods and services, while marginal utility means the 
amount of utility gained from the consumption of an additional unit of goods and services. In 
other words, total utility is an aggregation of marginal utility. Further, marginal utility or 
marginal benefits is also linked to the derivation of maximized net benefits which is the focus of 
this CBA. The net benefits use the first equimarginal principle which has different usage from the 
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption in our CBA study. The first equimarginal principle 
states that the net benefits are maximized when marginal social cost equals marginal benefit. the 
detailed explanation is provided in a separate section (section 2.5). 
 
In SDR, the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption does not refer to individuals but 
society. The elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption is high if future generations are 
perceived to have higher real incomes, thus higher consumption. This means that a high elasticity 
of the marginal utility of consumption results in a high SDR when using Ramsey’s equation; 
society weighs today’s consumption greater than the future’s consumption. Therefore, it refers to 
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intra-temporal inequality aversion (within a given time period), inter-temporal inequality aversion 
(across different time periods), or risk aversion (Groom & Maddison Pr, 2019); or the wealth 
effect when multiplied by the growth rate of consumption (HM Treasury, 2018). A more 
straightforward definition by Arrow et al. (2004) is: “a social preference for equality of 
consumption among generations.” Empirical studies show that the elasticity of the marginal 
utility of consumption ranges from 1 to 2 (Arrow, 1999; Boardman et al., 2010; Evans & Sezer, 
2004; Kula, 1984). In this report, we use the term “risk aversion” to refer to the elasticity of the 
marginal utility of consumption. 
 
The growth rate of per capita consumption or the real GDP per capita growth rate is the rate with 
inflation adjustment. It should be noted that the growth rate of per capita consumption should not 
be interfered with by any great economic events such as the 2020 financial crisis. This causes 
uncertainty in applying the historical data on the real GDP per capita growth rate. Gollier (2002) 
addresses a method to incorporate this uncertainty to be reflected in the social discount rate. Table 
2.3 summarizes empirical research done in the past to estimate the social discount rate using the 
SRTP approach. This shows that the social discount rate is affected by the real growth rate of per 
capita consumption.  
 
Table 2.3 Empirical research to estimate the social discount rate 
No. Country 𝝆𝝆 𝒆𝒆 𝒈𝒈 SRTP Reference 
1 Australia 1.5% 1.7 1.9% 4.7% (Evans & Sezer, 2004) 
2 France 1.0% 1.3 1.9% 3.5% (Evans & Sezer, 2004) 
3 Germany 1.0% 1.4 2.2% 4.1% (Evans & Sezer, 2004) 
4 UK 1.0% 1.5 2.1% 4.2% (Evans & Sezer, 2004) 
5 USA 1.5% 1.4 2.2% 4.6% (Evans & Sezer, 2004) 
6 Japan 1.5% 1.4 2.5% 5.0% (Evans & Sezer, 2004) 
7 India 1.3% 1.64 2.4% 5.2% (Kula, 2004) 
8 Italy 1.0% 1.34 2.1% 3.8% (Percoco, 2008) 
9 Cyprus 1.0% 1.0 3.1% 5.1% (Evans & Kula, 2011) 
10 USA 1.0% 1.35 2.0% 3.7% (Moore & Vining, 2018) 
11 South Korea 1.1% 1.0 4.0% 5.1% (Sohn, 2019) 
12 UK 1.5% 1.0 2.0% 3.5% (HM Treasury, 2018) 
13 Stern Review 0.1% 1.0 1.3% 1.4% (Stern, 2007) 
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The UK Green Book (2018) set a social discount rate of 3.5% for public investment (HM 
Treasury, 2018). When any project has a potential risk to life, a lower rate of 1.5% is justified by 
excluding the wealth effect, such as would be the case for toxic pollutants. This is the case where 
social welfare is maximized by saving more lives if mortality rates are astronomically high. It is 
noted that the Stern Review (2007) has the lowest SDR compared with other researchers by 
proposing 1.5% of the SDR for environmental policy. This attracts much criticism. Gollier et al., 
(2008), Nordhaus (2007) and Weitzman (2007) argued that by using the 1.5% SDR, though 
ethical to avoid damage for future generations, will cause a significant reduction in the incomes 
of poor people living today, leading to losses of welfare now and in the future. Therefore, they 
propose the use of a realistic and declining social discount rate, as discussed below. “Realistic,” 
in this case, means that the SDR should take into account the socioeconomic difference in society 
today and the challenge of institutional structure.  
 
For a long-term public investment, i.e., more than 100 years, a constant SDR might bring costs 
and benefits close to zero in the present value, especially in a country with a high growth rate of 
per capita consumption. This means that any public investment for future generations becomes 
insignificant. To counter this, many researchers advocate adjusting the SDR downward into the 
future. While the pure time preference rate and the risk aversion are subjective approximations, 
the growth rate of per capita consumption depends on technological progress and resource 
accumulations in the economy (Weitzman, 2007). This means that the growth rate of per capita 
consumption decreases over time due to technological progress and uncertainty about the future. 
Gollier et al. (2008) have also touted the use of a declining social discount rate because costs and 
benefits are spreading over a long period of time. For example, Sohn (2019) applies the notion of 
technological progress to adjust the future growth rate of per capita consumption, resulting in a 
declining SDR from 5.1% of SDR in an early year to 1.6% in 300 years4. Similarly, the Green 
Book (2018) uses the declining approach for a long-term investment, where the SDR starts to 
drop from 3.5% in year one to 1.0% in year 300 and more5. Unfortunately, SDR estimation is a 
                                                     
4 The SDR starts at 5.1% for the period of 2000 – 2030, then it falls to 4.1% for the period of 2031 – 2050, 
followed by 3.1% for the period of 2051 – 2100, and 2.1% for the period of 2101-2200. The last one is 
1.6% for the period of 2201-2300. 
5 To illustrate how importance of the discount rate is, we give an example of $100 being discounted for 100 
years. The $100 bill in the next 100 years has a value of 0.69 cents today when using a constant 5.1% 
discount rate, or $3.2 when using a constant 3.5% discount rate, or $2.2 when using a declining discount 
rate proposed by Sohn (2019). 
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work in progress. Research studies addressing intergenerational equity and uncertainties, by using 
either or both mathematical proofs and value judgments, have been emerging. This study can only 
present the widely cited and recent references. In this analysis, the following points are 
emphasized. 
 
Selecting the optimal SDR requires a value judgment (for the pure time preference rate and the 
risk aversion) and an estimate of the future real growth rate of per capita consumption, which is 
highly uncertain. Value judgments take altruism into consideration because future generations 
cannot represent themselves in today's decision making. So, it is considered justified to use a zero 
pure time preference rate. Therefore, the SDR is only based on the real growth rate of per capita 
consumption and the risk aversion. In the case that a policy with a highly altruism preference, the 
risk aversion will be set less than 1.0. Thus, the SDR would be less than the real growth rate of 
per capita consumption. Simply put, society sacrifices today’s consumption for future 
generations. This may not be the case for carbon dioxide emission reduction in small emitting 
countries, as their progressive climate actions might inevitably result in minimal impact to the 
global emission reductions. Furthermore, without proper infrastructure, poor people will suffer 
the most due to the progressive policy. At the same time, the urgency of climate mitigations to 
reduce potential future damage require immediate actions, as maintaining wealth is not relevant 
when future generations will be substantially worse off. Given this dilemma, the uncertainty of 
the SDR can be addressed by using sensitivity analysis. 
 
2.5 Economic efficiency 
 
The results of our CBA study will always yield to positive benefits to society as highlighted in 
section 1. To interpret the results in a more meaningful manner for decisionmakers, we use the 
first equimarginal principle together with Pigouvian subsidy rule to provide rationales why 
government intervention can improve market efficiency. Recall that net benefits are the 
difference between total benefits and total costs. A marginal cost function is derived from the 
total cost function, while a marginal benefit function is derived from the total benefit function. A 
marginal cost function has an upward slope because there are diminishing returns to inputs. For 
example, adding more workers can reduce their productivity and result in increased costs of the 
additional unit. Meanwhile a marginal benefit function has a downward slope because an 
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additional consumption of a product yields less satisfaction than a previous unit. In economics, 
this is called “diminishing marginal utility.” 
 
If there are externalities from implementing a program or a policy, the CBA should take the 
externalities into account. This can be done by adding externalities on top of private costs and 
benefits. Therefore, total costs are the sum of private costs and external costs (costs due to 
negative externalities). Similarly, total benefits are the sum of private benefits and external 
benefits (benefits due to positive externalities). If the net benefits are not maximized, the 
allocation of economic resources is not efficient. Market inefficiency occurs when there are some 
externalities that are not taken into account in the decision. Oftentimes, the private sector aims to 
maximize their private net benefits by intersecting a marginal private cost curve (MPC) and a 
marginal private benefit curve (MPB) as shown in Figure 2.2. The market optimal quantity, 
denoted by q*, is the quantity that the private sector would produce. The blue shaded area in 
Figure 2.2 denotes the portion of net benefits being accrued not specifically to the private sector 
but society at large. 
 
Figure 2.2 also depicts market inefficiency, which is represented by the yellow shaded area, 
which occur when some potential net benefits are not realized due to an inefficient allocation as 
in this study. This triangle is also known as “deadweight loss,” which is the loss of total welfare. 
The social optimal quantity, denoted with q**, is calculated by intersecting a marginal private 
cost curve (MPC) and a marginal social benefit curve (MSB). MSB is the sum of MPB and 
marginal external benefits. Note that this illustration does not have negative externalities, thus a 
marginal social cost curve is not used.  
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Figure 2.2 Conceptual net benefit maximization.  
 
To incentivize the private sector to produce at the social optimal quantity based on the Pigouvian 
subsidy rule, the private sector should be subsidized so that the new marginal private cost curve 
will intersect with the marginal private benefit curve at q**. The subsidy budget is the value of 
external benefits accrued to society at large.  
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MSB
MPB
q*
$/unit
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2.6 Data gaps 
 
The CBA tool is useful in the decision-making process; This helps to decide whether an 
investment efficiently promotes social welfare. However, based on the literature review, the CBA 
tool is not extensively used in the private sector, particularly tree plantations. One reason is that 
the net present value is highly positive for tree plantation investments, and another reason is the 
lack of guidelines to conduct the CBA in many developing countries. Besides, the challenge to 
employ CBA is how to quantify the benefits of non-market values, particularly carbon dioxide 
sequestration. This study uses existing data to quantify CO2 sequestration for specific tree 
species, the first of its kind for Lao PDR. 
 
Many assumptions must be made to conduct the CBA and ensure that a conservative estimate of 
the benefits of carbon dioxide sequestration so as not to oversell an environmental program that is 
controversial among some policymakers. The main components to estimate the benefits of carbon 
dioxide sequestration are the social discount rate and the social cost of carbon. So far, there is no 
regulation or research study to define those components for Lao PDR. The widely cited Ramsey 
equation may arrive at aa high social discount rate compared to other studies. Alternatively, if 
using the recommendation from the Stern Review or the UK Green Book with the lower social 
discount rate, the benefits seem so unrealistically high that it might be challenging to justify for 
Lao PDR. The choice of SDR requires value judgment for many stakeholders, including 
ecologists, policy scientists, and economists. It is beyond the current study to promote a particular 
choice of the SDR, and future investigation on other SDR values is one recommendation of this 
work. The second component is the social cost of carbon. As no data available on anthropometric 
climate damage in the country exist, it is impractical to derive the social cost of carbon for the 
country. The study will use other research studies and other countries’ environmental policy as a 
guidance to assign the ex-ante social cost of carbon for Lao PDR. 
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3 Study design 
 
This section explains how the CBA was conducted for tree plantation investment with the 
integration of CO2 sequestration. The private sector manages most tree plantations in Lao PDR; 
therefore, some components of CBA in this study take a different approach than a conventional 
CBA. Eucalyptus and teak plantations were chosen for this study because of the availability of 
recent data on costs and prices of timber by Maraseni et al. (2018) and Phimmavong et al. (2019). 
No primary data collection was done in this study. Other necessary and relevant data were 
gathered from several sources. The following sections provide detailed explanations for each 
component of the CBA.  
 
3.1 Cost-benefit analysis procedure 
 
Recall the objective of this study is to emphasize the use of CBA in decision making in both 
public and private sectors, aimed at internalizing social costs and social benefits due to climate-
related investment. By doing so, it requires setting the social discount rate lower than a market 
interest rate, because the purpose is to monetize social welfare, not financial returns on private or 
even government investment. The main steps of the conventional CBA adapted from Reid et al. 
(2005) are as follows: 
 
1. Determine the objectives of the CBA 
2. Identify the costs and benefit categories 
3. Value the costs and benefits 
4. Discount and aggregate the costs and benefits 
5. Perform a sensitivity analysis 
6. Conclude and prepare recommendations  
 
The following sections discuss the study setting, costs, and benefits of the investment, 
discounting approach, the net present value, and the efficiency criteria to justify government 
intervention. The last three steps of the CBA are discussed with the results in Chapter 4. 
 
 
29 
3.2 Description of the study setting 
 
There are two reforestation options: private companies and individual holders.  Reforestation 
practices were presumed to be established on degraded non-cultivated land. Two tree species, 
eucalyptus (either E. camaldulensis or E. tereticornis) and teak (T. grandis), were selected for this 
study. Eucalyptus is the most common species planted by multinational companies, mainly in 
central and southern parts of Lao PDR. Teak plantations, however, have been extensively planted 
by the smallholders in the northern part (Phimmavong et al., 2009).  
 
There are no available growth and yield data specifically for Lao PDR, this study refers to data on 
rotation ages and growth rates from the previous studies by Maraseni et al. (2018) and 
Phimmavong et al. (2019) for teak and eucalyptus in Lao PDR. In order to compare CBA results 
of different tree species with different rotation ages, thirty years was used as the investment 
period for both plantations. The consideration of 30-year period for the CBA reflects the current 
Law on Land (2013): Lao citizens are allowed to lease a piece of land from the Government for 
30 years. Input data for CBA are shown in Table 3.1. All explanations of how the input data are 
selected are in the following sections. 
 
Table 3.1 Input data for the cost benefit analysis 
Component Teak Eucalyptus 
Mean annual increment (m3/ha/year) 12.2 28.6 
Timber price ($/m3) 93.8 6 55.6 7 
Social cost of carbon ($/tCO2) 1 1 
Rotation age (years) 18 7 
CO2 sequestration function (tCO2) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 10.96 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒1.43 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 12.77 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒1.54 
Concession period (years) 30 30 
Nominal interest rate (%) 12 12 
Real interest rate (%) 8.3 8.3 
Social discount rate (%) 6.9 6.9 
                                                     
6 $84/m3 in 2017, convert to real price in 2020 using the inflation rate of 3.74%; 84*(1+0.0374)3 = $93.8 
7 $48/m3 in 2016, convert to real price in 2020 using the inflation rate of 3.74%; 48*(1+0.0374)4 = $55.6 
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In the CBA, there are two (2) main components: costs and benefits. The cost component in this 
study considers only the costs of plantations being borne by the private sector. The benefit 
component includes income from tree harvesting and the economic value of carbon sequestration. 
Also, the benefit component here does not represent the total economic value from tree 
plantations, as many non-market values are excluded. 
 
3.3 Costs of tree plantations 
 
Costs of tree plantations for teak and eucalyptus are extracted from previous studies by Maraseni 
et al. (2018) and Phimmavong et al. (2019). They show that the costs of plantations for 
eucalyptus are higher than that of teak: $6,333/ha versus $1,149/ha. This difference is explained 
by the fact that smallholders manage teak plantations, while private companies manage 
eucalyptus plantations. A private company is required to bear other costs, including a concession 
payment and development funds for local communities. A smallholder of teak plantations does 
not pay for harvesting costs, except plantation registration costs. Transportations costs were not 
included. All costs in the CBA are converted to the real costs by adjusting them with the 
consumer price index (CPI) inflation rate. Costs of plantations occur every rotation until the end 
of the concession period. It is assumed that the real costs of plantations do not change over time. 
 
3.4 Benefits of tree plantations 
 
The benefits of tree plantations are categorized into two types: market and non-market. Timber 
harvesting benefits are market values representing financial returns for an investor, while benefits 
from carbon sequestration are a non-market value representing social benefits. In many research 
studies, the term “carbon sequestration;” is measured in units of carbon dioxide (tCO2), while 
other studies measure carbon sequestration in units of carbon (tC). For consistency, carbon 
dioxide (CO2) sequestration will be used herein to refer to an amount of CO2 removed from the 
atmosphere by tree absorption, expressing as tons of carbon dioxide per hectare (tCO2/ha).  
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3.4.1 Timber harvest benefits 
 
Timber harvesting benefits stem from selling timber. Two pieces of information are needed to 
estimate benefits from timber harvest: the price of timber and volume of a tree stand at rotation 
age.  
 
Trees are priced primarily on timber quality, diameter, and length. Unfortunately, data on prices 
for teak and eucalyptus in Lao PDR are limited. Nevertheless, growers in northern Lao PDR 
reported that they did not receive timber prices greater than $84/m3 in 2017 for teak (Maraseni et 
al., 2018). In contrast, the small diameter of teak timber for Africa, America, and Asia are priced 
at $124/m3, $129/m3 and $149/m3 on average, respectively (Kollert, 2013; Midgley et al., 2015), 
and the medium-size log price is $282/m3 on average in Asia (Midgley et al., 2015). In the case of 
eucalyptus, it was reported that the timber price at a farm gate (without transporting costs) is 
$48/m3 in 2016 (Phimmavong et al., 2019). Similar to costs, prices are adjusted for inflation to 
arrive at the real prices of timber in 2020 dollars. Though resource scarcity can drive the real 
value of timber up through scarcity rents, this study assumes a constant price over a concession 
period of 30 years to be conservative in the estimation of benefits.  
 
Tree volumes at rotation age are typically estimated using a growth function. To maximize long-
term wood production, trees are theoretically harvested at a biological rotation age or when the 
growth rate, or the mean annual increment (MAI), starts to decline (see Figure A.5). The MAI is 
calculated by dividing yield with stand age. Generally, teak has the highest MAI at the age of 40 - 
60 years (Ball et al., 1999), while the MAI is highest for eucalyptus at 7-15 years (Lamprecht, 
1990) based on its locations, spacing, site properties, and plantation management. In the case of 
developing countries, selected rotation age tends to be shorter than biological rotation age. 
Presumably, the private owners aim to maximize financial returns based on current timber prices. 
For example, the reported rotation age for teak in Lao PDR is 18 – 24 years while the rotation age 
for eucalyptus is 7 years (Maraseni et al., 2018; Phimmavong et al., 2019).  
 
Data on rotation age and growth rate from several works of literature are summarized in Table 
3.2. Unfortunately, it is not currently possible to obtain functions for yield or growth rate by using 
regression analysis due to discrepancies in reported characteristics. Studies on growth and yields 
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for teak and eucalyptus are also limited in Lao PDR. Therefore, this study uses data provided by 
previous literature.  
 
This study estimates the volume of tree stands at a rotation by multiplying MAI with a harvesting 
age. MAI for teak is 12.2 m3/ha/year for the 18-year rotation age, while 28.6 m3/ha/year of MAI 
is selected for eucalyptus for the 7-year rotation age. 
 
Table 3.2 Rotation and growth data for teak and eucalyptus 
Species Rotation age 
(years) 
Mean annual increment 
(m3/ha/year) 
Reference 
T. grandis 14 10.7 – 13.3 (Zahabu et al., 2015), Tanzania 
T. grandis 18 - 24 9.3 - 12.2 (Maraseni et al., 2018), Laos 
T. grandis 40 9.3 (Pandey & Brown, 2000), Costa Rica 
T. grandis 60 – 70 6 – 9 (Pandey, 1983), India and Nigeria 
T. grandis 60 – 70 12 – 15 (Pandey, 1983), Indonesia 
T. grandis 60 – 80 4 – 8 (Evans, 1992), India 
Eucalyptus spp. 7 28.6 (Phimmavong et al., 2019), Laos 
E. camaldulensis  10 15 – 18 (Pohjonen & Pukkala, 1994); Thailand 
E. camaldulensis 10 – 20 5 – 10 (Evans, 1992); Dry tropics 
E. camaldulensis 10 – 20 30 (Evans, 1992); Moist tropics 
E. tereticornis and E. 
camaldulensis 
7 15 – 24 (Harwood & Nambiar, 2014), SE Asia 
 
3.4.2 Benefits from CO2 sequestration 
 
In order to elicit the value of benefits from CO2 sequestration, two pieces of information are 
required: (1) CO2 sequestration in units of tCO2 per hectare; and (2) the value of carbon dioxide 
or the social cost of carbon (SCC) in dollars per tCO2. There are two approaches to estimate CO2 
sequestration in trees. The first approach is to estimate based on tree yields. However, data on 
tree yields (or tree volumes or MAI) are reported in a data range as shown in Table 3.2, and a 
regression analysis using such data cannot be done, as highlighted in section 3.4.1. The second 
approach is to estimate based on carbon content inside a tree. There are some studies providing 
carbon pool stock stored in tree volumes of teak and eucalyptus for different stand ages (see 
Table A.7 and Table A.8 in the Appendix). This allows us to estimate CO2 sequestration in units 
of tCO2 per hectare by multiplying the carbon pool stock, which is in a unit of tC per hectare, by a 
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unit convertor (12 mass units of C = 44 mass units of CO2). Regression analysis was done using 
amount of CO2 sequestration as the dependent variable and stand age of tree as independent 
variable. A log-log functional form was selected to reflect zero sequestration when tree is first 
planted. The mathematical model for regression analysis is shown in Eq. (2). 
 
 ln𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = b0 + b1 ln𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 Eq. (2) 
 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 is CO2 sequestration (tCO2/ha), 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 is the stand age of tree (years), and b0 and b1 
are coefficients. The regression results have a high R-squared of 0.87 and 0.70 for teak and 
eucalyptus, respectively. p-values for t-test for all coefficients as well as p-values for F-test are 
less than 0.05, which means that estimated coefficients are statistically significant at a 95% 
confidence level. The regression models for both tree species are also an unbiased estimator 
based on tests for normality, heteroscedasticity, non-linearity and model specification. The log-
log model was retransformed into a linear-power function using smearing retransformation (see 
Appendix A.2 for a detailed analysis). The results of CO2 sequestration functions are shown 
below.   
 
CO2 sequestration for teak: 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 10.96 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒1.43 Eq. (3) 
CO2 sequestration for eucalyptus: 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 12.77 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒1.54 Eq. (4) 
 
The above functions show that at a stand age of one, eucalyptus sequestrates CO2 of 12.77 
tCO2/ha, which is higher than 10.96 tCO2/ha for teak. Due to a higher power number8, eucalyptus 
also sequestrates more than teak does as a stand age increases. To calculate the economic value of 
CO2 sequestration in a value of dollars per hectare, an amount of CO2 sequestration based on a 
stand age is calculated using the above function and then multiplied by the value of SCC.  
 
In the case of SCC estimation, the SCC estimate is ambiguous and highly controversial even for 
the global estimates. However, it is an essential metric for climate policies. Without SCC, the 
benefits of CO2 sequestration from tree plantations become zero. In practice, many countries set 
their ex-ante SCC, specifically for carbon tax rates, ranged from $3 to $168/tCO2 in 2015 (World 
Bank Group, 2017, p. 90). The SCC is expected to increase over time based on a country’s effort 
                                                     
8 1.54 is for eucalyptus and 1.43 is for teak, based on Eq. (4) and Eq. (3), respectively. 
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to reduce carbon dioxide. In the case of Lao PDR, using a country-level SCC estimated by Ricke 
et al. (2018), results in a SCC less than $1/tCO2, which is on the very low end of the spectrum. 
Although the real figure is unknown, this study assumes $1/tCO2 for CO2 sequestration from tree 
plantations as the base case to be conservative in the estimate of benefits. A sensitivity analysis is 
done later to evaluate the impact of the change in the SCC. 
 
In addition to the estimation of the monetary value of CO2 sequestration benefits, it needs to be 
understood that the land policy can act as a constraint for trees to sequestrate. The relationship of 
predicted CO2 sequestration and rotation age with consideration of a 30-year concession is shown 
in Figure 3.1.  Apparently, when a selection rotation age, of any tree species, approaches a limit 
of 30 years, the total as well as average CO2 sequestration potential dwindles. Also, Some 
selections of rotation age result in zero CO2 sequestration at the end of year 30. Therefore, the 
predicted CO2 sequestration for 30 years with different rotation ages has a non-smooth curve, as 
shown in Figure 3.1. The estimation here was carefully done within a range of sample data: 1 to 
20 years for teak and 3 to 10 years for eucalyptus. This is to avoid uncertainty, mainly when the 
sample data range does not cover the biological rotation age. Table A.17 in the Appendix 
provides a full calculation of CO2 sequestration with different rotation ages.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Relationships of predicted CO2 sequestration and rotation age with a 30-year 
concession as a constraint 
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It can be concluded that the 30-year concession period may not allow trees to grow and reach 
their potential. Similarly, the selection of rotation age also affects the maximum CO2 
sequestration. It is unsurprising to find eucalyptus has more CO2 sequestration potential than teak 
given the same rotation age.  
 
Given the concession of 30 years by using a rotation age of teak and eucalyptus plantations of 18 
years and 7 years, respectively, it can be concluded that CO2 is sequestrated from the atmosphere 
at about 1001.5 tCO2/ha for teak plantations and 961.8 tCO2/ha for eucalyptus plantations. The 
similar sequestration values are due to the contrasting attributes of the low growth rate with the 
longer selected rotation age for teak plantations compared with the high growth rate but the 
shorter selected rotation age for eucalyptus plantations. On average, the annual CO2 sequestration 
for both plantations is 32 tCO2/ha/year, while the CO2 sequestration of natural forests is only 2.45 
tCO2/ha/year based on a study done by Yen & Wang (2013) in Taiwan. Thus, society gets more 
benefits from tree plantations than natural plantations in terms of CO2 sequestration potential. 
 
3.5 Discounting approach 
 
Unlike the World Bank’s recommended discount rate of  10 to 12% for project appraisal in 
developing countries (Bonzanigo & Kalra, 2014), this study employs the dual discounting 
approach to discount financial returns and benefits of CO2 sequestration separately. There are two 
discount rates used in this CBA; the real interest rate for discounting cash flows of financial 
returns and the growth-rate-adjusted social discount rate (SDR) for discounting benefits of CO2 
sequestration. The real interest rate is calculated by subtracting the inflation rate from the nominal 
interest rate. A nominal interest rate of 12% was used based on the borrowing interest rate from 
the Agriculture Promotion Bank, which is the only state bank that gives loans for agriculture and 
forestry investment projects in Lao PDR. The inflation rate, estimated by using the consumer 
price index (CPI) from 2010 – 2019, is 3.74% on average (Bank of Lao PDR [BOL], n.d.), is 
calculated from the difference of CPI of the current year and the previous year, then divided by 
the previous CPI. Thus, the real interest rate of 8.3% was applied for financial analysis. The high 
real interest rate in developing countries such as Lao PDR can be explained by the limited 
availability of credit provided by banks and a default risk inducing banks to charge a high interest 
rate for borrowing.  
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In contrast, the SDR is estimated based on the consumption discount rate equation developed by 
Ramsey (1928). The SDR estimate represents intertemporal equity; how much society weighs 
today’s consumption compared to the consumption of future generations. It is also assumed to 
differ from country to country. By using Ramsey’s equation, the SDR in developing countries is 
expected to be higher than in developed countries. This is not entirely associated with higher risks 
due to unpredictable politics in developing countries, but mainly due to a higher real GDP per 
capita growth rate in emerging economies. Based on nine-year data on real GDP per capita from 
2010 - 2019 in a local currency, Lao PDR has a real GDP per capita growth rate of 5.9% on 
average. Therefore, according to Ramsey’s equation, with the assumptions of the pure rate of 
time preference at 1.0% and the wealth effect at 1.0, the social discount rate is 6.9%9. The social 
discount rate of 6.9% is high compared with studies done in other developed and developing 
countries, which will lead to a more conservative estimate of intertemporal benefits. This 6.9% 
SDR is still lower than a general SDR applied by developing countries, which ranges between 8-
15% (Zhuang et al., 2007). This high SDR reflects the perception of the social opportunity cost of 
public funds and the consideration of intergenerational equity. To contrast, the lower SDR of 
1.5% and 3.5% is also used to illustrate possible benefits that can be obtained. The 1.5% SDR 
represents the consideration of only a pure rate of time preference to reflect social altruism 
toward the future, while the 3.5% SDR is to represent the value as if it is assessed for developed 
countries. 
 
3.6 Net present value 
 
In general, an investment is efficient when benefits are greater than costs. In CBA, under the 
social welfare condition, an investment maximizes social welfare when social benefits are greater 
than social costs in present value terms, also known as positive net present value (NPV). The 
NPV is a summation of the present value of all future benefits less the present value of all future 
costs. To show how the dual discounting approach is used, benefits of CO2 sequestration and 
revenues from timber sales are treated separately, given different rates of discounting. The real 
interest rate is used to discount revenues, while the SDR is used to discount the benefits of CO2 
sequestration. Thus, the calculation of the net present value for this study is shown in Eq. (5). 
                                                     
9 1.0% + 1.0 * 5.9% 
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where NPV is the net present value (dollars), 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is revenues at time t (dollars), 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 is costs at time t 
(dollars), 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 is benefits from CO2 sequestration at time t (dollars), r is the real interest rate (%), 
SDR is the social discount rate (%), t is a number of year (year), and T is the total period (years). 
 
The private rate of return and the social rate of return are also used to represent the internal rate of 
return (IRR) for the private sector and the public sector. IRR is a measure of the expected rate of 
return from the investment projects at which NPV is equal to zero. The social rate of return (SRR) 
refers to the rate of return with consideration of externalities.  
 
The land expectation value (LEV), which is another indicator for financial analysis, is a standard 
discounted cash flow (DCF) technique to value timberland. This allows the estimation of the 
value of bare land for perpetuity for even-aged rotations. LEV is suitable for a long-term 
evaluation, whereas NPV is for a short-term evaluation rotation of 5 to 20 years. It is noted that 
the LEV formula assumes constant dollars and a real interest rate.  
 
 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = �𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∗ (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡  
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 Eq. (6) 
 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁 =
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 − 1
 Eq. (7) 
 
where LEV is land expectation value (dollars), and NFV is the net future value of one timber 
rotation (dollars). The LEV refers to the financial value of timberland or financial returns for a 
long-term investment. Thus, the non-market value is not included. All other formulas used are 
provided in Appendix A.4. All monetary values in this study are in 2020 dollars (USD).  
 
3.7 Efficiency in government intervention 
 
The NPV is a means to decide whether a project should proceed or not, regardless of the public or 
private sector. However, the decision of government intervention in a private market considers 
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additional elements. The deviations between social returns and private returns have been used to 
justify state intervention since Pigou (1920) was published. The difference in social returns and 
private returns is due to externalities (benefit of carbon sequestration from plantations). 
Government intervention is a means to encourage or discourage producers who create 
externalities. The exclusion of negative externalities can cause a market failure while the 
exclusion of positive externalities results in underinvestment for social benefits. Figure A.4 in the 
Appendix illustrates a government intervention rule proposed by Warner (2013) for any type of 
investment with negative or positive externalities. In our study, carbon sequestration is a positive 
externality. Therefore, criteria for government intervention in private tree plantations adapted 
from Warner (2013) are: 
 
(1) The social rate of return is higher than the private rate of return; and 
(2) The private rate of return is less than the market interest rate.  
 
The second criterion demonstrates that if the private rate of return is higher than the market 
interest rate, the private sector will voluntarily invest. Government intervention may not create 
much difference in social returns. When the government intervention criteria are met, the next 
question is how to determine the budget for government intervention. By applying the first 
equimarginal principle explained in section 2.5, the inclusion of the external benefits due to 
carbon sequestration results  in the net social benefits being higher than the net private benefits. 
Therefore, to incentivize the private sector to maximize the net social benefits instead of the net 
private benefits, the Pigouvian subsidy rule suggests that the private sector should be subsidized 
with the same value of external benefits being accrued to society at large. In other words, the 
budget for government intervention equals the value of external benefits. The subsidy payment 
can be in many forms, and our study proposes the subsidy payment is generated by regulation 
improvement to increase the private rate of returns. 
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4 Results and Discussions 
 
The results of CBA provided in this section include (1) the cost-benefit analysis for private tree 
plantations for two tree species (teak and eucalyptus) in Lao PDR, (2) the impact of the change in 
social discount rate and social cost of carbon on the net present values of non-market benefits, 
and (3) the result justifications that take into account different policy and anticipated damage 
scenarios which will affect policy priority and proposed budget of government intervention. 
Discussions on why the results of this study are not only defensible but conservative are also 
provided.  
 
4.1 Cost-benefit analysis for private tree plantations 
 
Unlike studies done by Maraseni et al. (2018) and Phimmavong et al. (2019), this study considers 
the 30-year concession period when conducting CBA. This allows the comparison of results from 
different tree species with different rotation ages. The results, including costs, benefits, net 
benefits, net present value (NPV), private rate of return, social rate of return, and land expectation 
value (LEV) for both plantations, are shown in Table 4.1. Also, the social NPV, which is the sum 
of market NPV and non-market NPV, is provided (see Appendix A.1 for technical details on 
CBA). 
Table 4.1 Results of the cost-benefit analysis over 30 years (in 2020) 
  Teak 18-year rotation age 
 Eucalyptus 
7-year rotation age 
Timber yield (m3/ha)   354    772 
CO2 sequestration (tCO2/ha)   1,002    962 
 Market Non-market Total  Market Non-market Total 
Cost $2,470 0 $2,470  $19,791 0 $19,791 
Benefit $33,180 $1,002 $34,182  $42,930 $962 $43,891 
Net benefit $30,710 $1,002 $31,711  $23,139 $962 $24,101 
Net present value $4,696 $397 $5,093  $4,574 $391 $4,965 
Rate of return 18.0% - 19.0%  18.0% - 18.7% 
Land expectation value $6,176 - -  $10,731 - - 
 
When interpreting the results, we use the term “private” to refer to the analysis that considers 
only market value, and the term “social” to refer to the analysis that considers both market and 
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non-market value. Also, values from other studies were adjusted into 2020 dollars. The 
interpretation of the results follows. 
 
Timber yields and CO2 sequestration 
 
Being characteristically fast growing, eucalyptus plantations yield higher wood production of 772 
m3/ha compared to teak with a timber yield of 354 m3/ha for a 30-year plantation; though the 
rotation time period for eucalyptus is 7 years, lower than that of teak which is 18 years.  Due to 
more frequent rotations, eucalyptus plantations can sequestrate slightly less CO2 from the 
atmosphere than teak plantations, at 962 tCO2/ha and 1,002 tCO2/ha respectively. However, using 
a different rotation age can vary the timber yields and CO2 sequestration. The interpretation here 
only considers the current practice of the rotation age selection based on previous studies.  
 
There are two possible outcomes to inform policymakers. First, given the current objective of the 
Lao Government allocating 1.2 million hectares with the goal to increase forest cover as well as 
wood production, eucalyptus investments should be a priority. Second, if the government decides 
to set CO2 sequestration as the main objective for tree plantations, possibly in the near future, 
then it will be more beneficial to consider enhancing the teak plantation industries. Nevertheless, 
this distinction between plantation priorities still needs further exploration—for instance, 
priorities can be ranked based on the probability of success of government intervention for 
different tree markets. Teak plantations are primarily in the northern part of Lao PDR, while 
eucalyptus plantations are located mostly in the central and southern parts of Lao PDR. Each 
location has unique characteristics in terms of social-economic and cultural aspects. When 
converting timber yields and CO2 sequestration into a monetary benefit, similar interpretations 
were reached, where teak yields a higher value of CO2 sequestration and eucalyptus yields a 
higher value of wood production (see the interpretation of benefits in the following sub-section). 
 
Net benefits 
 
Net benefit is the difference between benefits and costs from an investment. The results of this 
study show higher social net benefits compared to private net benefits. The social net benefits are 
$31,711/ha and $24,101/ha for teak and eucalyptus plantations, respectively. This is due to the 
internalization of non-market value - CO2 sequestration. The non-market value for CO2 
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sequestration from both tree species is not much different; $1,002/ha for teak and $962/ha for 
eucalyptus, which is about 3.2% and 4.0% of total benefits10 – not a trivial percentage. Therefore, 
by taking an average of net benefits from both types of plantations, society can get net benefits 
from tree plantations around $930/ha/year11 for 30 years, where the benefit of carbon 
sequestration accounts for 3.5% of the total net benefit. Compared to results from a study 
conducted in China, the total net benefit for tree plantations from our study is lower than the total 
net benefit from Guo et al. (2001) for natural forests, which is $1,199/ha/year. Market benefits are 
the main component of the total net benefits of our study, while the total net benefits estimated by 
Guo et al. (2001) were largely derived from non-market values. The authors did not only include 
benefits of carbon sequestration, but also non-market benefits from soil and water regulations. 
 
Net present value (NPV) 
 
It is not surprising to find positive private NPV (or market NPV) for teak and eucalyptus 
plantations, which are $4,696/ha and $4,574/ha, respectively. The positive market NPV is also 
found in previous studies (Maraseni et al., 2018; Phimmavong et al., 2019). A graph to compare 
the results of this study to previous studies can be found in Figure A.3 in the Appendix12. For a 
long-term evaluation, it shows that the LEV for eucalyptus is higher compared with teak: 
$10,731/ha and $6,176/ha. Note that the LEV is a means to measure for financial analysis only; 
thus, it is only calculated from market value. The difference of LEV implies that eucalyptus 
plantations provide a higher long-term return on investment. However, caution should be taken 
into account when translating the LEV results. This analysis did not consider the possible 
increase in the real price of timber in the future, especially for teak. Given a slow growth rate of 
teak, and a likely higher future demand, the real price of teak is expected to increase faster than 
that of eucalyptus, because of the scarcity in the future. The long-term value of teak plantations 
may be higher than $6,176/ha. 
 
                                                     
10 ($1,002/$31,711) * 100 = 3.15% and ($962/$24,101) * 100 = 3.99%. 
11 ($31,711 + $24,101)/2/30 = $930. 
12 Technically, the results of this study cannot be compared exactly with the previous studies, because 
different approaches are used. Previous studies use a nominal interest rate to discount nominal costs and 
revenues, while this study use a real interest rate to discount real costs and revenues. Most importantly, the 
main difference is a time parameter. This study added a 30-year concession period. Nevertheless, the 
results of this study do show some alignment with previous studies – a positive NPV. 
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The social NPV is slightly higher than the private NPV for both plantations, similar to the 
interpretation of net benefits earlier, due to the addition of non-market benefits. The social NPVs 
for teak and eucalyptus are $5,093/ha and $4,965/ha, respectively. The non-market value, CO2 
sequestration, from both tree species is not much different, with an average of $394/ha in a 
present term, or about 7.8% of the average social NPV13.  
 
Rate of returns 
 
A similar conclusion is obtained for the rate of returns, in which the social rate of return (SRR) is 
slightly higher than the private rate of return due to the integration of non-market value. The SRR 
is 19% and 18.7% for teak and eucalyptus plantations, while the private rate of returns is 18.0% 
for both plantations. The SRR is expected to be higher than what we use in this study if other 
non-market values are included.  
 
Recall government intervention is efficient when the SRR is greater than the private rate of 
returns (first criterion), and the private rate of return is less than the market interest rate (second 
criterion). Given the current study, it can be said that it is rational for the government to intervene 
in private tree plantations, as it meets the first criterion. However, the intervention may be subject 
to less priority from a government’s perspective. Because the private rate of return is higher than 
the market real interest rate of 8.3%, the private sector will voluntarily invest in tree plantations 
regardless of additional government support. Our justification is that government intervention by 
improving systems and regulations can increase the private rate of return and eventually 
incentivize the private sector to plant more trees. 
 
4.2 Impact of social cost of carbon and social discount rate 
 
Input data to the CBA are subject to uncertainty, such as timber price, the market interest rate, the 
inflation rate, the real growth rate of per capita consumption (which is used to estimate the SDR) 
and so on. This study only considers uncertainty related to the value of non-market benefits. The 
reason is that the non-market benefits are used to determine the budget for government 
intervention. Recall the SCC and SDR only affect the non-market component, and the real growth 
                                                     
13 ($5,093 + $4,965) / 2 = $5,029; and $394/$5,029 * 100 = 7.8%. 
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rate of per capita income is used to estimate the SDR. Thus, a sensitivity analysis was performed 
for the non-market NPV and SRR given the change in the SCC and the growth rate of per capita 
consumption.  
 
Impact of SCC on the non-market NPV 
 
The ex-ante SCC is set at $1/tCO2. A sensitivity analysis was done by changing the percentage 
change in SCC. Table 4.2 shows the non-market NPV with changes in the SCC. It is not 
surprising to find a linear relationship between the SCC and the non-market NPV, because the 
non-market NPV uses a constant SCC in the calculation. It can be concluded that an increase in 
the SCC results in an increase in the non-market NPV, and vice versa, in an equal magnitude. A 
ten percent increase of the SCC will increase the non-market NPV by ten percent. 
 
Table 4.2 Impact of social cost of carbon (SCC) on the net present value of non-market benefits 
SCC ($/tCO2) 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 
(% change of SCC) (-20%) (-10%) (0%) (+10%) (+20%) 
Teak $318 $357 $397 $437 $476 
 (-20%) (-10%) (0%) (+10%) (+20%) 
Eucalyptus $313 $352 $391 $430 $469 
 (-20%) (-10%) (0%) (+10%) (+20%) 
Note: percent differences to the base case are in parenthesis. 
 
Impact of the growth rate of per capita consumption on the non-market NPV 
 
Based on macroeconomic data, the real growth rate of per capita consumption for Lao PDR 
ranges between 3.1% to 9.3%, with an average of 5.9% (BOL, n.d.) (see Table A.15 in the 
Appendix). A sensitivity analysis was done for the change of growth rate of per capita 
consumption, as shown in Table 4.3. The SDR was recalculated based on Ramsey’s equation (a 
pure rate of time preference of 1.0% and the risk aversion of 1.0). The non-market NPV was also 
recalculated. The results show that the non-market NPV for teak plantations is slightly more 
sensitive to the change of growth rate of per capita consumption than eucalyptus plantations. 
When the growth rate of per capita consumption increases by 10%, the non-market NPV 
decreased by 6.3% and 5.9% for teak and eucalyptus, respectively.  
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Table 4.3 Impact of the growth rate of per capita consumption on the net present value (NPV) of 
non-market component  
SDR (%) 5.72 6.31 6.90 7.49 8.79 
(% change of growth rate of per capita 
consumption) (-20%) (-10%) (0%) (+10%) (+20%) 
Teak $455 $424 $397 $372 $325 
 (+14.6%) (+6.8%) (0%) (-6.3%) (-18.1%) 
Eucalyptus $445 $416 $391 $368 $324 
 (+13.8%) (+6.4%) (0%) (-5.9%) (-17.1%) 
Note: percent differences to the base case are in parenthesis. 
 
Impact of the SCC on the SRR 
 
The social rate of return (SRR) was recalculated with the change in the SCC by holding other 
input parameters constant. By doing so, it is expected that only the non-market component of the 
social NPV is changed. The market NPV remains that same, which is $4,696/ha and $4,574/ha 
for teak and eucalyptus, respectively. The results are in Table 4.4. Note that the SRR is calculated 
from net benefits (not present values of net benefits). Therefore, the change of SDR does not 
affect the SRR. The results show that the SRR is not sensitive to the SCC. A ten (10) percent 
increase in the SCC results in a 0.5 percent increase in the SRR for teak plantations and 0.38% for 
eucalyptus plantations. This is due to the benefits of the non-market value of tree plantations is 
minimal compared to market value; on average, the non-market value accounts for 3.5% of the 
total net benefits or 7.8% of the social net present values.  
 
Table 4.4 Impact of the social cost of carbon (SCC) on the social rate of return (SRR) 
SCC ($/tCO2) 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 
(% change of SCC) (-20%) (-10%) (0%) (+10%) (+20%) 
Teak 18.82% 18.91% 19.01% 19.10% 19.20% 
 (-1.00%) (-0.50%) (0%) (+0.50%) (+1.00%) 
Eucalyptus 18.52% 18.59% 18.67% 18.74% 18.81% 
 (-0.76%) (-0.38%) (0%) (+0.38%) (+0.76%) 
Note: percent differences to the base case are in parenthesis. 
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4.3 Result justifications 
 
The main justification of the current study is the fact that existing problems related to tree 
plantations are presumed to take a long time to solve. This is a common policy in poor and 
developing countries, but other social-economic issues often get a higher priority. This study aims 
to advocate to the government the need for intervention to provide incentives for private investors 
to plant more trees. Non-market value is accrued to society and, as shown earlier, sensitive to the 
choice of SCC and SDR. For simplicity. We take four (4) scenarios for our result justifications. 
Each scenario uses different SDR and SCC resulting to differences in the non-market NPV as 
shown in Table 4.5. 
 
(1) the altruism scenario with relatively high damage due to climate change 
(2) the altruism scenario with relatively low damage due to climate change 
(3) the social welfare balance scenario with relatively high damage due to climate change 
(4) the social welfare balance scenario with relatively low damage due to climate change 
 
Table 4.5 the non-market NPV associated with different scenarios 
Scenario SDR SCC Non-market NPV 
1 1.5% $1/tCO2 $780/ha 
2 1.5% $5/tCO2 $3901/ha 
3 6.9% $1/tCO2 $394/ha 
4 6.9% $5/tCO2 $1970/ha 
 
The NPV of non-market benefits stemming from tree plantations associated with the considered 
scenarios. When the SCC is set at $1/tCO2, by using 1.5% SDR the non-market NPV is $780/ha 
while using 6.9% SDR the non-market NPV is $394/ha. When the SCC is $5/tCO2, the non-
market NPV increases by five times. Detailed analysis can be found in Table A.5, Table A.6, and 
Table A.18 in the Appendix. The SDR of 1.5% represents the altruism scenario, while the SDR of 
6.9% represents the social welfare balance scenario. The lowest non-market NPV is $394/ha for 
tree plantations on average, while the highest non-market NPV is 3,901/ha.  
 
Note that the 3.5% SDR provides the mid-point between the 1.5% and 6.9% SDR for the non-
market NPV, as shown in Table A.18 in the Appendix, which is $591/ha for the SCC of $1/tCO2 
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and $2,955/ha for the SCC of $5/tCO2. This can represent the average value between the altruism 
scenario and the social welfare balance scenario.  
 
The choice of SDR 
 
Recall that in Ramsey’s equation, the SDR is calculated based on a pure rate of time preference, 
an elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption (a risk aversion), and a growth rate of per 
capita income. To maintain social welfare, the 6.9% SDR is used. The 1.5% SDR represents only 
a pure rate of time preference of 1.5%, excluding the wealth effect (a real growth rate of per 
capita consumption). By using the 1.5% SDR in evaluating an environmental policy, the sacrifice 
of today’s welfare by investing heavily now for the benefits of future generations is accounted 
for. Since the plantation investment in this study is a short to medium term, and the non-market 
value is moderately sensitive to the choice of SDR, the 6.9% is also justified. The 1.5% SDR can 
be used in CBA for a long-term investment by using a declining discounting approach as an 
example from Sohn (2019). For instance, 6.9% for 0 – 50 years, 3.5% for 50 – 100 and 1.5% for 
100+ years. 
 
The choice of SCC 
 
There are several non-market values of tree plantations such as air quality, carbon sequestration, 
water quality regulation, natural hazard regulation, and erosion prevention. Unfortunately, 
research of non-market values of tree plantations in Lao PDR or Southeast Asia is limited. Since 
non-market values are subject to local preference and socio-economic settings, it is somewhat 
impractical to use a benefit transfer by taking economic values from other literature (mainly from 
developed countries) to include in this study. This requires data calibration beyond an economic 
adjustment. People in developed countries value ecosystem services differently from people in 
developing countries. Non-market value for this study only refers to carbon sequestration benefits 
and does not refer as a proxy to represent the whole spectrum of non-market values. The benefits 
of non-market value could be substantially higher than the results of this study. However, study 
assumptions were made to keep the analysis conservative in the estimation of benefits. 
 
Practically, the SCC has already been applied in the form of emission trading systems or carbon 
taxes, which are called carbon pricing initiatives. Theoretically, carbon taxes should be equal to 
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the SCC to limit GHG emissions. A carbon tax is a Pigouvian tax to encourage social 
responsibility by creating the incentive to consume less fossil fuel. A carbon tax is a means to 
adjust carbon emissions to an optimal quantity by considering negative externalities (GHG 
emission). Therefore, this basis can be used to find the current SCC used in other parts of the 
world. In 2019, 7 out of 29 countries who implemented carbon taxes reported carbon prices 
between $1 to $5/tCO2, including Japan ($2.6/tCO2) and Singapore ($3.6/tCO2) (World Bank, 
2019). The rest of the 22 countries are mainly developed countries, and the carbon taxes are as 
high as $121/tCO2 in Sweden. Though prices in carbon pricing initiatives are not necessarily 
comparable, due to different sectors covered and fluctuating exchange rates, it provides an 
intuition on the price range of the SCC. Given that, it is reasonable to choose the SCC for Lao 
PDR between $1 to $5/tCO2.  
 
In conclusion, we suggest that the environmental policy in Lao PDR should use the social welfare 
balance with relatively low damage as a minimum requirement for evaluating a short-term tree 
plantation investment. The non-market value of $394/ha from tree plantations is also appropriate 
to use as the basis to advocate for government intervention of tree plantation markets in Lao 
PDR. Higher values could be justified depending on the environmental policy in the country. 
Alternatively, this is the lowest unit value supported by the best studies currently available.   
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5 Conclusions  
 
Government interventions could potentially improve the efficiency of private investment. The 
current financial analysis for tree plantations in Lao PDR shows high returns on investment. 
However, there are many issues related to the investment, including high upfront costs of 
plantations, poor quality of timber, lack of plantation management, and timber prices controlled 
by wood manufactures, to name a few. Proposed interventions are thoroughly discussed in recent 
technical studies, including Maraseni et al. (2018) and Phimmavong et al. (2019). For a sound 
policy, the Government needs to know how much of the budget is required to invest in improving 
the efficiency of timber markets. 
 
This study integrates the social benefits of tree plantations. Tree plantations provide financial 
returns to an investor - in this case, the private sector - while also providing social benefits, such 
as carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere, resulting in cleaner air and reducing the risk of 
global climate change damage, which accrue to society. Without this recognition of social 
benefits, the Government may underinvest in the tree plantation sector.  
 
Efficiency criteria for government intervention were applied, and the results suggest that there is 
a positive externality to society from private tree plantations. Government intervention can help 
increase the private rate of return by improving existing infrastructure and regulations to 
incentivize the private sector to plant more trees. We use the first equimarginal principle of 
economics to rationalize the budget for government intervention. The principle says that social 
net benefits are maximized when the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. In private tree 
plantations, the costs and incomes are accrued to the private sector. A positive externality from 
non-market value such as carbon sequestration is accrued to society. Thus, the non-market value 
can be used as a basis to allocate funds and support from the government to improve a private 
market to operate more efficiently. The SCC, by definition, is the marginal benefit of carbon 
dioxide emission reduction. Therefore, the intervention budget equals the SCC times unit of 
carbon dioxide being removed by tree plantations.  
 
The conservative estimate shows additional social net benefits from private tree plantations in 
monetary value equals $982/ha, on average, over 30 years. By using 1.2 million hectares of tree 
plantations allocated by the Government, this can be translated to additional social benefits of 
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$1,178 million over 30 years. With the first equimarginal principle, the Government should 
allocate $1,178 million over 30 years for improving existing infrastructure and regulations to 
raise the private rate of return efficiently. Eventually, the private sector can expand their 
plantations.  
 
Converting this future benefit into a present term results in $394/ha or $472.8 million14 over 30 
years. This implies that under the conservative estimate, the budget required to improve the 
efficiency of tree plantations for the private sector in Lao PDR is $472.8 million in today's value, 
which is 2.3% of the gross domestic product in 202015.  
 
The implication of this study to policymakers can be summarized as follows. 
(1) Government intervention in the private tree plantations market is justified because the 
social rate of return is higher than the private rate of return. Though the private sector 
voluntarily engages in tree plantations, existing issues related to tree markets in Lao PDR 
are the barriers for the private sector to maximize their financial returns.  
(2) The social rate of return is not sensitive to the economic value of carbon sequestration in 
private tree plantations, as the benefits of carbon sequestration are small compared to 
financial benefits from selling timber. In other words, assigning a higher social cost of 
carbon does not significantly affect an intervention priority. However, the selection of a 
social cost of carbon affects the budget intervention. Given limited data on damage due to 
climate change in the country, it is rational to assign a social cost of carbon at a lower 
bound. 
(3) The intervention budget is estimated at $472.8 million in today’s value for 30 years, 
which is 2.3% of the gross domestic product in 2020. The result of this study is based on 
the current land allocation for tree plantations by the Government.  
(4) This budget can be used to improve the quality of timber, regulations, knowledge 
exchanges, market prices, and some other climate-related activities. A focus group 
discussion with relevant agencies for ranking activity priorities can help to allocate this 
budget.  
 
                                                     
14 $394/ha * 1.2 million ha = $472.8 million. 
15 The GDP in 2018 was reported at $17.87 billion with the growth rate of 6.29% per year 
(https://www.lsb.gov.la/en/home/), the GDP in 2020 is projected to be $20.26 billion.  
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To endorse the budget estimate in this study requires further considerations by carefully 
investigating several assumptions used in this study. The study assumptions are based on peer-
reviewed journals, value judgments from prominent researchers in the field, and lessons learned 
from mainly developed countries. Some of those assumptions are politically debatable and 
subject to the country’s effort and commitment to combat climate change. The effects of the study 
assumption are summarized in the following table, which shows a negative sign if the assumption 
results in a conservative estimate of benefits, and a positive sign where the assumption may not 
be as conservative; a question mark is used if the direction of the effect is unknown. 
 
Table 5.1 The effects of the study assumption 
No. Affected 
component 
Assumptions Effect 
1 Market 
value 
Previous studies on financial returns done by  Maraseni et al. (2018) 
and Phimmavong et al. (2019) did not explicitly indicate how expenses 
are distributed for some items. For example, overhead costs, including 
concession fees and community development funds, are not known if 
they are a one-off payment or recurring expense. We assume the 
overhead costs were a one-off payment paid at the beginning of the 
plantation year, which would drive down costs as compared to a 
recurring expense. 
- 
 
2 Market 
value 
The land expectation value is widely used to measure a long-term 
value of bare land at the start of an even-aged forest rotation, mainly to 
identify optimal even-aged management aiming at maximizing 
financial returns. With the assumption of identical rotations, a change 
in costs of plantations and timber prices is not considered. The NPV 
results are expected to be either higher or lower, depending on which 
components have a higher change in magnitude. 
? 
3 Market 
value 
The study uses the CPI inflation rate to adjust all costs and timber 
prices from different years to the real values in 2020. Since timber is 
known as a raw good, it is reasonable to use the inflation rate of the 
producer price index (PPI). However, due to unavailable data in the 
country, the CPI inflation rate is used.  
? 
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Table 5.1 (continued) 
No. Affected 
component 
Assumptions Effect 
4 Market 
value 
To avoid the effect of the foreign exchange rate, the CBA would be 
conducted in the local currency. However, the existing data on costs of 
plantations and timber prices were reported in the US dollars with 
possible errors of round numbers. Thus, costs and prices, expressed in 
US dollars, are assumed not to be affected by the exchange rate. The 
exchange rate from LAK (Lao Kip) to USD is 8,297 ± 0.83% from 
2016 to 202016, which is not highly fluctuated. 
? 
5 Market 
value 
The value of tree plantations changes over time, mainly due to scarcity 
rent going up given lower quantities available. The real value of trees 
would also expect to be increasing. Unfortunately, there is no dataset 
on the price of trees to justify if scarcity rent exists in tree plantations 
in Lao PDR. The NPV results are expected to be higher when 
considering the increase in the real timber prices. 
- 
6 Market 
value 
The effect of technological progress is assumed to be minimal for a 
short-term investment. Technological progress reduces the real growth 
rate of per capita consumption. In return, it reduces the social discount 
rate estimated by using Ramsey’s formula. The NPV with 
consideration of technological progress will be higher. 
- 
7 Non-market 
value 
The focus of this study is to quantify non-market benefits to the 
country populations. However, it does not change the fact that the rest 
of the world, which is a third party for this study, also gets benefits if 
the proposed government intervention take place in Lao PDR. There 
may be positive externalities that are unquantified within the scope of 
study. 
- 
8 Non-market 
value 
Eucalyptus is known for environmental degradation, as it replaces 
indigenous forests, depleting food and shelter sources and therefore 
affecting animals and birds. Also, it degrades soil quality that becomes 
unsuitable for some other tree species, reducing the future possibility 
of biodiversity enhancement. The NPV results might be lower when 
considering this cost.  
+ 
                                                     
16 The exchange rate was from https://www.lsb.gov.la/lsb-la.htm, and the descriptive statistics was done for 
data from 2016 to 2020. 
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Table 5.1 (continued) 
No. Affected 
component 
Assumptions Effect 
9 Non-market 
value 
CO2 sequestration potential can be directly estimated by converting 
tree volumes to carbon storage and then to the CO2 sequestration 
amount. However, due to data limitation of tree volumes or yields for 
Lao PDR, it is impossible to estimate using such a method. Therefore, 
the CO2 sequestration was estimated from reported carbon storage 
from each tree species in equations. The regression analysis from 
existing literature was used, which might be subject to overfitting, 
sampling bias, and outliers.  
? 
10 Non-market 
value 
It is intuitive to assign the value of $1/tCO2 for the SCC following 
some countries who apply the SCC in carbon taxes at $1 - $5/tCO2 
regardless of the difference in terms of economic scale and energy 
mix. Nevertheless, the ex-ante SCC in this study is set at a lower 
bound.  
- 
11 Non-market 
value 
The study considers only one type of non-market value, which is for 
CO2 sequestration. There are many benefits of tree plantations. 
Therefore, the results underestimate the total economic value of tree 
plantations. 
- 
12 Non-market 
value 
The assumption of SCC is to capture all damage caused by climate 
change within the country. However, it is challenging to justify when 
the SCC variable can take on a wide range. As such, a sensitivity 
analysis is performed. 
? 
13 Non-market 
value 
The GHG re-emissions such as burning, if any, are not considered in 
this study. It is a separate issue that is not covered by tree plantation 
activity but would create losses. 
+ 
 
The assumptions above affect either market or non-market values to estimate net benefits. The 
results of this study focus on non-market value as it is used as a basis to determine the 
intervention budget. Given the best available data and possible conservative assumptions, the 
study is still subject to uncertainty, where the effect of some assumptions cannot predict the 
direction. This can be enhanced through future research studies.  
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Upon the completion of this study, further consideration of negative externalities such as 
environmental impacts from tree plantations should be considered, such as environmental 
degradations (item 8 in Table 5.1). Also, revision of CO2 sequestration function should be made 
when there is a study on a tree yield function so that the CO2 sequestration can be estimated based 
on a yield function, not a regression from existing literature (item 9 in Table 5.1). The SCC 
should be estimated based on local economic damages due to climate change. This requires a 
well-established database to store historical disasters, and a damage assessment should be done to 
determine the magnitude of damage due to anthropogenic GHG emissions (item 12 in Table 5.1). 
Lastly, to minimize a possible carbon leakage (a reduction of GHG emissions results in an 
increase of GHG emissions in another place), holistic planning and management should be 
considered by involving all agencies subject to GHG emissions.  
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Appendix 
A.1 Technical report – Cost and benefit analysis 
This is the technical description of the cost-benefit analysis for private tree plantations in Lao 
PDR. It is a supplement to the main report. Unless otherwise specified, all input data on monetary 
values are expressed in 2020 real values  (see Table 3.1, Table A.1, and Table A.2 for input data). 
In this analysis, market value is the income from timber harvesting, while the non-market value is 
the benefits of carbon dioxide sequestration. The detailed analysis is summarized as follows: 
 
• Costs of plantations from previous studies were from 2017 and 2018 for teak and 
eucalyptus plantations, respectively. All costs were adjusted with the consumer price 
index (CPI) inflation rate of 3.74% (see Table A.15 for CPI) to arrive at the real costs in 
2020 (Table A.1 and Table A.2). For example, the nominal costs of planting and land for 
teak plantations are $616.3/ha and $35/ha in 2017. Thus, the real costs of planting in 
2020 are $727.1/ha. 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐2020 = 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐2017 ∗  (1 + 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁 𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒)∆𝑡𝑡 
                                                   = ($616.3 + $35) ∗  (1 + 3.74%)2020−2017 
                                                   = $727.1 
 
• Timber prices were reported in 2017 and 2016 for teak and eucalyptus, respectively. All 
prices were adjusted to 2020 dollars by using the same CPI inflation rate as the costs. For 
example, the nominal price of teak timber is $84/m3 in 2017. Thus, the real price of teak 
timber in 2020 is $93.78/m3. 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒2020 = 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒2017 ∗  (1 + 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁 𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒)∆𝑡𝑡 
                                                             = $84 ∗  (1 + 3.74%)2020−2017 
                                                             = $93.78 
𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒2020 = 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒2016 ∗  (1 + 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁 𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒)∆𝑡𝑡 
                                                                        = $48 ∗  (1 + 3.74%)2020−2016 
                                                                        = $55.59 
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• Revenues or incomes from timber harvesting were calculated by multiplying a mean 
annual increment (MAI) and a harvesting year with a timber price. For example, the MAI 
of teak is 12.2 m3/ha/year at the age of 18 years, and the timber price is $93.78/m3. 
Therefore, the income from harvesting is $20,594/ha for one rotation. The total income 
over 30 years was calculated from the summation of income from each rotation.  
 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒 = 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 ∗  𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 
                                            = 12.2 ∗ 18 ∗ $93.78 
                                            = $20,594 
 
• The benefits of carbon dioxide (CO2) sequestration were calculated by multiplying the 
carbon dioxide sequestration potential with the social cost of carbon (SCC). Detailed 
analysis of the CO2 sequestration potential is in Appendix A.2. If the SCC was set at 
$1/tCO2, and the amount of carbon dioxide sequestrated from the atmosphere in one year 
was 11 tCO2/ha, the benefits of CO2 sequestration in monetary terms was $11/ha. The 
total benefit of CO2 sequestration is the accumulation of the annual benefits over the 
predefined period, 30 years (see a list of assumptions below). 
 
• The dual discounting approach was used. The real interest rate of 8.26% was applied for 
the market component (costs and incomes), while the social discount rate (SDR) of 6.9% 
was for the non-market component, in this case, benefits of CO2 sequestration. The 
calculation of the real interest rate and the SDR is in the following.  
 
The real interest rate  = nominal interest rate – inflation rate 
   = 12% - 3.74%  
   = 8.26% 
The social discount rate  = 𝜌𝜌 + 𝑒𝑒 ∗ 𝑔𝑔         (based on Ramsey’s equation in Section 2.4) 
   = 1.0% + 1.0 * 5.9% 
   = 6.9% 
• The present values (PV) for market and non-market components were calculated 
separately using the real interest rate and the SDR, respectively. For each component, the 
summation of the PVs is the net present value (NPV). The total NPV is the summation of 
the NPV-market and the NPV-nonmarket (See Table A.3 and Table A.4). 
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• A sensitivity analysis was done to identify the impact of the SDR and the SCC on the 
NPV-nonmarket (see Table A.5 and Table A.6). 
 
A list of assumptions for the CBA is shown below. 
• The CBA for teak and eucalyptus plantations was performed for 30 years, based on Law 
on Land (2013). 
• Even-age plantations were assumed for all rotations except the last rotation, which trees 
are at the end of the 30 years. 
• A constant MAI of tree species was assumed. 
• The real costs of plantations obtained from Maraseni et al. (2018) and Phimmavong et al. 
(2019) did not change over the 30 years. 
• Scarcity rent was set to zero - no changes in real prices of timber over the 30-year 
concession period. 
• The CPI inflation rate of 3.74% was assumed to be constant (see Table A.15). 
• The analysis was assumed not to be influenced by the foreign exchange rate, labor 
productivity, or technological progress. Also, the real growth rate of per capita 
consumption was assumed to be constant (see Table A.15).  
 
 
67 
 
Ta
bl
e 
A
.1
 D
at
a 
on
 th
e 
no
m
in
al
 c
os
ts
 o
f t
ea
k 
pl
an
ta
tio
ns
 in
 2
01
7 
w
ith
 th
e 
re
al
 c
os
ts
 in
 2
02
0 
ad
ju
st
ed
 a
t t
he
 in
fla
tio
n 
ra
te
 o
f 3
.7
4%
 
 
Y
ea
r 
N
om
in
al
 c
os
ts
, $
/h
a 
(in
 2
01
7)
 
 
R
ea
l c
os
ts
, $
/h
a 
(in
 2
02
0)
 
 
Pl
an
tin
g 
co
st
s 
La
nd
 c
os
ts
 
R
eg
is
tra
tio
n 
co
st
s 
 
Pl
an
tin
g 
an
d 
la
nd
 c
os
ts
 
R
eg
is
tra
tio
n 
co
st
s 
 
0 
61
6 
35
 
0 
 
72
7.
1 
0 
 
1 
14
7 
19
 
0 
 
17
8.
6 
0 
 
2 
10
3 
15
 
0 
 
12
2.
6 
0 
 
3 
63
 
15
 
0 
 
78
.1
 
0 
 
4 
63
 
15
 
0 
 
75
.9
 
0 
 
5 
0 
0 
56
.8
 
 
0 
52
.8
 
So
ur
ce
: a
da
pt
ed
 fr
om
 M
ar
as
en
i e
t a
l. 
(2
01
8)
. 
 
Ta
bl
e 
A
.2
. D
at
a 
on
 th
e 
no
m
in
al
 c
os
ts
 o
f e
uc
al
yp
tu
s p
la
nt
at
io
ns
 in
 2
01
8 
w
ith
 th
e 
re
al
 c
os
ts
 in
 2
02
0 
ad
ju
st
ed
 a
t t
he
 in
fla
tio
n 
ra
te
 o
f 3
.7
4%
 
 
Y
ea
r 
N
om
in
al
 c
os
ts
, $
/h
a 
(in
 2
01
8)
 
 
R
ea
l c
os
ts
, $
/h
a 
(in
 2
02
0)
 
 
Pl
an
tin
g 
co
st
s 
La
nd
 c
os
ts
 
O
ve
rh
ea
d 
co
st
s 
H
ar
ve
st
in
g 
co
st
 
 
Pl
an
tin
g 
an
d 
la
nd
 c
os
ts
 
O
ve
rh
ea
d 
co
st 
H
ar
ve
st
in
g 
co
st
 
 
0 
1,
19
3 
0 
1,
26
0 
0 
 
1,
28
3.
9 
1,
35
6.
0 
0 
 
1 
12
0 
50
 
0 
0 
 
17
6.
4 
0 
0 
 
2 
25
 
50
 
0 
0 
 
75
.0
 
0 
0 
 
3 
17
 
50
 
0 
0 
 
64
.6
 
0 
0 
 
4 
17
 
50
 
0 
0 
 
62
.3
 
0 
0 
 
5 
17
 
50
 
0 
0 
 
60
.0
 
0 
0 
 
6 
17
 
50
 
0 
0 
 
57
.8
 
0 
0 
 
7 
17
 
50
 
0 
3,
30
0 
 
55
.8
 
0 
2,
74
6.
5 
So
ur
ce
: a
da
pt
ed
 fr
om
 P
hi
m
m
av
on
g 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
9)
. 
 N
ot
e:
 C
on
ve
rti
ng
 n
om
in
al
 c
os
ts
 to
 re
al
 c
os
ts
 w
as
 d
on
e 
by
 u
si
ng
 e
qu
at
io
n 
5 
in
 T
ab
le
 A
.1
6.
   
 
 
 
 
68 
 
Ta
bl
e 
A
.3
. T
he
 d
et
ai
le
d 
C
BA
 fo
r t
ea
k 
pl
an
ta
tio
ns
 d
is
co
un
te
d 
at
 8
.3
%
 fo
r n
et
 in
co
m
e 
an
d 
6.
9%
 fo
r t
he
 b
en
ef
its
 o
f C
O
2 s
eq
ue
st
ra
tio
n 
 
 
M
ar
ke
t c
om
po
ne
nt
 
 
N
on
-m
ar
ke
t c
om
po
ne
nt
 
 
To
ta
l 
 
Y
ea
r 
To
ta
l 
co
st
 
Ti
m
be
r 
yi
el
d 
To
ta
l 
in
co
m
e 
N
et
 
in
co
m
e 
be
ne
fit
s 
 
A
cc
um
ul
at
ed
 
C
O
2 
se
qu
es
tra
tio
n 
A
nn
ua
l 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l C
O
2 
se
qu
es
tra
tio
n 
A
nn
ua
l i
nc
re
m
en
ta
l 
be
ne
fit
 o
f C
O
2 
se
qu
es
tra
tio
n 
 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f n
et
 
in
co
m
e 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
at
 8
.3
%
 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f C
O
2 
be
ne
fit
s d
is
co
un
tin
g 
at
 6
.9
%
 
To
ta
l  
pr
es
en
t 
va
lu
e 
 
 
($
) 
(m
3 /h
a)
 
($
) 
($
) 
 
(tC
O
2/h
a)
 
(tC
O
2/h
a)
 
($
) 
 
($
) 
($
) 
($
) 
 
0 
72
7.
1 
0 
0 
-7
27
.1
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
-7
27
.1
 
0 
-7
27
.1
 
 
1 
17
8.
6 
0 
0 
-1
78
.6
 
 
11
.0
 
11
.0
 
11
.0
 
 
-1
65
.0
 
10
.2
 
-1
54
.8
 
 
2 
12
2.
6 
0 
0 
-1
22
.6
 
 
29
.4
 
18
.4
 
18
.4
 
 
-1
04
.6
 
16
.1
 
-8
8.
5 
 
3 
78
.1
 
0 
0 
-7
8.
1 
 
52
.3
 
22
.9
 
22
.9
 
 
-6
1.
6 
18
.8
 
-4
2.
8 
 
4 
75
.9
 
0 
0 
-7
5.
9 
 
78
.8
 
26
.5
 
26
.5
 
 
-5
5.
2 
20
.3
 
-3
5.
0 
 
5 
52
.8
 
0 
0 
-5
2.
8 
 
10
8.
2 
29
.4
 
29
.4
 
 
-3
5.
5 
21
.1
 
-1
4.
4 
 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
14
0.
2 
32
.0
 
32
.0
 
 
0 
21
.5
 
21
.5
 
 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
17
4.
6 
34
.4
 
34
.4
 
 
0 
21
.6
 
21
.6
 
 
8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
21
1.
2 
36
.5
 
36
.5
 
 
0 
21
.4
 
21
.4
 
 
9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
24
9.
7 
38
.5
 
38
.5
 
 
0 
21
.1
 
21
.1
 
 
10
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
29
0.
1 
40
.4
 
40
.4
 
 
0 
20
.7
 
20
.7
 
 
11
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
33
2.
2 
42
.1
 
42
.1
 
 
0 
20
.2
 
20
.2
 
 
12
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
37
6.
0 
43
.8
 
43
.8
 
 
0 
19
.7
 
19
.7
 
 
13
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
42
1.
3 
45
.3
 
45
.3
 
 
0 
19
.0
 
19
.0
 
 
14
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
46
8.
2 
46
.8
 
46
.8
 
 
0 
18
.4
 
18
.4
 
 
15
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
51
6.
4 
48
.3
 
48
.3
 
 
0 
17
.7
 
17
.7
 
 
16
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
56
6.
1 
49
.7
 
49
.7
 
 
0 
17
.1
 
17
.1
 
 
17
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
61
7.
1 
51
.0
 
51
.0
 
 
0 
16
.4
 
16
.4
 
 
18
 
0 
21
9.
6 
20
,5
94
.5
 
20
,5
94
.5
 
 
66
9.
4 
52
.3
 
52
.3
 
 
4,
93
5.
4 
15
.7
 
4,
95
1.
2 
 
19
 
72
7.
1 
0 
0 
-7
27
.1
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
-1
61
.0
 
0 
-1
61
.0
 
 
20
 
17
8.
6 
0 
0 
-1
78
.6
 
 
11
.0
 
11
.0
 
11
.0
 
 
-3
6.
5 
2.
9 
-3
3.
6 
 
21
 
12
2.
6 
0 
0 
-1
22
.6
 
 
29
.4
 
18
.4
 
18
.4
 
 
-2
3.
2 
4.
5 
-1
8.
6 
 
22
 
78
.1
 
0 
0 
-7
8.
1 
 
52
.3
 
22
.9
 
22
.9
 
 
-1
3.
6 
5.
3 
-8
.3
 
 
23
 
75
.9
 
0 
0 
-7
5.
9 
 
78
.8
 
26
.5
 
26
.5
 
 
-1
2.
2 
5.
7 
-6
.5
 
 
24
 
52
.8
 
0 
0 
-5
2.
8 
 
10
8.
2 
29
.4
 
29
.4
 
 
-7
.9
 
5.
9 
-1
.9
 
 
25
 
0 
0 
0 
0.
0 
 
14
0.
2 
32
.0
 
32
.0
 
 
0 
6.
0 
6.
0 
 
26
 
0 
0 
0 
0.
0 
 
17
4.
6 
34
.4
 
34
.4
 
 
0 
6.
1 
6.
1 
 
27
 
0 
0 
0 
0.
0 
 
21
1.
2 
36
.5
 
36
.5
 
 
0 
6.
0 
6.
0 
 
28
 
0 
0 
0 
0.
0 
 
24
9.
7 
38
.5
 
38
.5
 
 
0 
5.
9 
5.
9 
 
29
 
0 
0 
0 
0.
0 
 
29
0.
1 
40
.4
 
40
.4
 
 
0 
5.
8 
5.
8 
 
30
 
0 
13
4.
2 
12
,5
85
.5
 
12
,5
85
.5
 
 
33
2.
2 
42
.1
 
42
.1
 
 
1,
16
3.
7 
5.
7 
1,
16
9.
4 
 
To
ta
l 
2,
47
0.
3 
35
3.
8 
33
,1
80
.0
 
30
,7
09
.7
 
 
6,
98
9.
4 
1,
00
1.
6 
1,
00
1.
6 
 
4,
69
5.
7 
39
7.
0 
5,
09
2.
7 
 
 
69 
 
Ta
bl
e 
A
.4
. T
he
 d
et
ai
le
d 
C
BA
 fo
r e
uc
al
yp
tu
s p
la
nt
at
io
ns
 d
is
co
un
te
d 
at
 8
.3
%
 fo
r n
et
 in
co
m
e 
an
d 
6.
9%
 fo
r t
he
 b
en
ef
its
 o
f C
O
2 s
eq
ue
st
ra
tio
n 
 
 
M
ar
ke
t c
om
po
ne
nt
 
 
N
on
-m
ar
ke
t c
om
po
ne
nt
 
 
To
ta
l 
 
Y
ea
r 
To
ta
l 
co
st
 
Ti
m
be
r 
yi
el
d 
To
ta
l 
in
co
m
e 
N
et
 
in
co
m
e 
be
ne
fit
s 
  
A
cc
um
ul
at
ed
 
C
O
2 
se
qu
es
tra
tio
n 
A
nn
ua
l 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l C
O
2 
se
qu
es
tra
tio
n 
A
nn
ua
l i
nc
re
m
en
ta
l 
be
ne
fit
 o
f C
O
2 
se
qu
es
tra
tio
n 
  
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f n
et
 
in
co
m
e 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
at
 8
.3
%
 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f C
O
2 
be
ne
fit
s d
is
co
un
tin
g 
at
 6
.9
%
 
To
ta
l  
pr
es
en
t  
va
lu
e 
 
  
($
) 
(m
3 /h
a)
 
($
) 
($
) 
  
(tC
O
2/h
a)
 
(tC
O
2/h
a)
 
($
) 
  
($
) 
($
) 
($
) 
 
0 
2,
63
9.
9 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-2
,6
39
.9
 
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
-2
,6
39
.9
 
0.
0 
-2
,6
39
.9
 
 
1 
17
6.
4 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-1
76
.4
 
 
12
.8
 
12
.8
 
12
.8
 
 
-1
62
.9
 
12
.0
 
-1
51
.0
 
 
2 
75
.0
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-7
5.
0 
 
37
.1
 
24
.3
 
24
.3
 
 
-6
4.
0 
21
.2
 
-4
2.
7 
 
3 
64
.6
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-6
4.
6 
 
69
.1
 
32
.0
 
32
.0
 
 
-5
0.
9 
26
.2
 
-2
4.
7 
 
4 
62
.3
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-6
2.
3 
 
10
7.
5 
38
.4
 
38
.4
 
 
-4
5.
3 
29
.4
 
-1
5.
9 
 
5 
60
.0
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-6
0.
0 
 
15
1.
4 
43
.9
 
43
.9
 
 
-4
0.
4 
31
.5
 
-8
.9
 
 
6 
57
.8
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-5
7.
8 
 
20
0.
3 
48
.9
 
48
.9
 
 
-3
5.
9 
32
.8
 
-3
.1
 
 
7 
2,
80
2.
3 
20
0.
2 
11
,1
29
.9
 
8,
32
7.
6 
 
25
3.
8 
53
.5
 
53
.5
 
 
4,
77
8.
0 
33
.5
 
4,
81
1.
5 
 
8 
1,
33
7.
7 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-1
,3
37
.7
 
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
-7
09
.0
 
0.
0 
-7
09
.0
 
 
9 
17
6.
4 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-1
76
.4
 
 
12
.8
 
12
.8
 
12
.8
 
 
-8
6.
3 
7.
0 
-7
9.
3 
 
10
 
75
.0
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-7
5.
0 
 
37
.1
 
24
.3
 
24
.3
 
 
-3
3.
9 
12
.5
 
-2
1.
5 
 
11
 
64
.6
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-6
4.
6 
 
69
.1
 
32
.0
 
32
.0
 
 
-2
7.
0 
15
.4
 
-1
1.
6 
 
12
 
62
.3
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-6
2.
3 
 
10
7.
5 
38
.4
 
38
.4
 
 
-2
4.
0 
17
.2
 
-6
.8
 
 
13
 
60
.0
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-6
0.
0 
 
15
1.
4 
43
.9
 
43
.9
 
 
-2
1.
4 
18
.5
 
-2
.9
 
 
14
 
57
.8
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-5
7.
8 
 
20
0.
3 
48
.9
 
48
.9
 
 
-1
9.
0 
19
.2
 
0.
2 
 
15
 
2,
80
2.
3 
20
0.
2 
11
,1
29
.9
 
8,
32
7.
6 
 
25
3.
8 
53
.5
 
53
.5
 
 
2,
53
2.
2 
19
.7
 
2,
55
1.
9 
 
16
 
1,
33
7.
7 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-1
,3
37
.7
 
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
-3
75
.7
 
0.
0 
-3
75
.7
 
 
17
 
17
6.
4 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-1
76
.4
 
 
12
.8
 
12
.8
 
12
.8
 
 
-4
5.
8 
4.
1 
-4
1.
6 
 
18
 
75
.0
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-7
5.
0 
 
37
.1
 
24
.3
 
24
.3
 
 
-1
8.
0 
7.
3 
-1
0.
7 
 
19
 
64
.6
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-6
4.
6 
 
69
.1
 
32
.0
 
32
.0
 
 
-1
4.
3 
9.
0 
-5
.3
 
 
20
 
62
.3
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-6
2.
3 
 
10
7.
5 
38
.4
 
38
.4
 
 
-1
2.
7 
10
.1
 
-2
.6
 
 
21
 
60
.0
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-6
0.
0 
 
15
1.
4 
43
.9
 
43
.9
 
 
-1
1.
3 
10
.8
 
-0
.5
 
 
22
 
57
.8
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-5
7.
8 
 
20
0.
3 
48
.9
 
48
.9
 
 
-1
0.
1 
11
.3
 
1.
2 
 
23
 
2,
80
2.
3 
20
0.
2 
11
,1
29
.9
 
8,
32
7.
6 
 
25
3.
8 
53
.5
 
53
.5
 
 
1,
34
2.
0 
11
.5
 
1,
35
3.
5 
 
24
 
1,
33
7.
7 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-1
,3
37
.7
 
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
-1
99
.1
 
0.
0 
-1
99
.1
 
 
25
 
17
6.
4 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-1
76
.4
 
 
12
.8
 
12
.8
 
12
.8
 
 
-2
4.
2 
2.
4 
-2
1.
8 
 
26
 
75
.0
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-7
5.
0 
 
37
.1
 
24
.3
 
24
.3
 
 
-9
.5
 
4.
3 
-5
.2
 
 
27
 
64
.6
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-6
4.
6 
 
69
.1
 
32
.0
 
32
.0
 
 
-7
.6
 
5.
3 
-2
.3
 
 
28
 
62
.3
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-6
2.
3 
 
10
7.
5 
38
.4
 
38
.4
 
 
-6
.7
 
5.
9 
-0
.8
 
 
29
 
60
.0
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
-6
0.
0 
 
15
1.
4 
43
.9
 
43
.9
 
 
-6
.0
 
6.
3 
0.
3 
 
30
 
2,
80
4.
4 
17
1.
6 
9,
53
9.
9 
6,
73
5.
5 
  
20
0.
3 
48
.9
 
48
.9
 
  
62
2.
8 
6.
6 
62
9.
4 
 
To
ta
l 
19
,7
90
 
77
2.
2 
42
,9
29
.5
 
23
,1
38
.9
 
  
3,
07
3.
7 
96
1.
8 
96
1.
8 
  
4,
57
3.
9 
39
1.
0 
4,
96
5 
 
 
70 
 
Ta
bl
e 
A
.5
. B
en
ef
its
 o
f C
O
2 s
eq
ue
st
ra
tio
n 
pe
r h
ec
ta
re
 fo
r t
ea
k 
pl
an
ta
tio
ns
 d
is
co
un
te
d 
at
 1
.5
%
, 3
.5
%
, a
nd
 6
.9
%
 o
f t
he
 so
ci
al
 d
is
co
un
t r
at
e 
(S
D
R
) 
 
 
Th
e 
SC
C
 a
t $
1/
tC
O
2 
 
Th
e 
SC
C
 a
t $
5/
tC
O
2 
 
Y
ea
r 
A
nn
ua
l 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l C
O
2 
be
ne
fit
s a
t S
C
C
 
of
 $
1/
tC
O
2, 
$ 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f 
C
O
2 b
en
ef
its
 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
at
 
1.
5%
, $
 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f 
C
O
2 b
en
ef
its
 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
at
 
3.
5%
, $
 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f 
C
O
2 b
en
ef
its
 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
at
 
6.
9%
, $
 
 
A
nn
ua
l 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l C
O
2 
be
ne
fit
s a
t S
C
C
 
of
 $
5/
tC
O
2, 
$ 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f 
C
O
2 b
en
ef
its
 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
at
 
1.
5%
, $
 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f 
C
O
2 b
en
ef
its
 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
at
 
3.
5%
, $
 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f 
C
O
2 b
en
ef
its
 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
at
 
6.
9%
, $
 
 
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
1 
11
.0
 
10
.8
 
10
.6
 
10
.2
 
 
54
.8
 
54
.0
 
52
.9
 
51
.2
 
 
2 
18
.4
 
17
.9
 
17
.2
 
16
.1
 
 
92
.1
 
89
.4
 
86
.0
 
80
.6
 
 
3 
22
.9
 
21
.9
 
20
.7
 
18
.8
 
 
11
4.
6 
10
9.
6 
10
3.
4 
93
.8
 
 
4 
26
.5
 
24
.9
 
23
.1
 
20
.3
 
 
13
2.
3 
12
4.
6 
11
5.
3 
10
1.
3 
 
5 
29
.4
 
27
.3
 
24
.8
 
21
.1
 
 
14
7.
1 
13
6.
6 
12
3.
9 
10
5.
4 
 
6 
32
.0
 
29
.3
 
26
.1
 
21
.5
 
 
16
0.
2 
14
6.
5 
13
0.
3 
10
7.
4 
 
7 
34
.4
 
31
.0
 
27
.0
 
21
.6
 
 
17
1.
9 
15
4.
9 
13
5.
1 
10
7.
8 
 
8 
36
.5
 
32
.4
 
27
.7
 
21
.4
 
 
18
2.
7 
16
2.
2 
13
8.
7 
10
7.
1 
 
9 
38
.5
 
33
.7
 
28
.3
 
21
.1
 
 
19
2.
6 
16
8.
5 
14
1.
3 
10
5.
7 
 
10
 
40
.4
 
34
.8
 
28
.6
 
20
.7
 
 
20
1.
9 
17
4.
0 
14
3.
1 
10
3.
6 
 
11
 
42
.1
 
35
.8
 
28
.9
 
20
.2
 
 
21
0.
6 
17
8.
8 
14
4.
3 
10
1.
1 
 
12
 
43
.8
 
36
.6
 
29
.0
 
19
.7
 
 
21
8.
9 
18
3.
1 
14
4.
9 
98
.3
 
 
13
 
45
.3
 
37
.4
 
29
.0
 
19
.0
 
 
22
6.
7 
18
6.
8 
14
5.
0 
95
.2
 
 
14
 
46
.8
 
38
.0
 
28
.9
 
18
.4
 
 
23
4.
2 
19
0.
2 
14
4.
7 
92
.0
 
 
15
 
48
.3
 
38
.6
 
28
.8
 
17
.7
 
 
24
1.
4 
19
3.
1 
14
4.
1 
88
.7
 
 
16
 
49
.7
 
39
.1
 
28
.6
 
17
.1
 
 
24
8.
3 
19
5.
7 
14
3.
2 
85
.4
 
 
17
 
51
.0
 
39
.6
 
28
.4
 
16
.4
 
 
25
5.
0 
19
8.
0 
14
2.
1 
82
.0
 
 
18
 
52
.3
 
40
.0
 
28
.1
 
15
.7
 
 
26
1.
4 
20
0.
0 
14
0.
7 
78
.7
 
 
19
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
20
 
11
.0
 
8.
1 
5.
5 
2.
9 
 
54
.8
 
40
.7
 
27
.5
 
14
.4
 
 
21
 
18
.4
 
13
.5
 
8.
9 
4.
5 
 
92
.1
 
67
.4
 
44
.7
 
22
.7
 
 
22
 
22
.9
 
16
.5
 
10
.8
 
5.
3 
 
11
4.
6 
82
.6
 
53
.8
 
26
.4
 
 
23
 
26
.5
 
18
.8
 
12
.0
 
5.
7 
 
13
2.
3 
93
.9
 
60
.0
 
28
.5
 
 
24
 
29
.4
 
20
.6
 
12
.9
 
5.
9 
 
14
7.
1 
10
2.
9 
64
.4
 
29
.7
 
 
25
 
32
.0
 
22
.1
 
13
.6
 
6.
0 
 
16
0.
2 
11
0.
4 
67
.8
 
30
.2
 
 
26
 
34
.4
 
23
.4
 
14
.1
 
6.
1 
 
17
1.
9 
11
6.
8 
70
.3
 
30
.3
 
 
27
 
36
.5
 
24
.4
 
14
.4
 
6.
0 
 
18
2.
7 
12
2.
2 
72
.2
 
30
.2
 
 
28
 
38
.5
 
25
.4
 
14
.7
 
5.
9 
 
19
2.
6 
12
7.
0 
73
.5
 
29
.7
 
 
29
 
40
.4
 
26
.2
 
14
.9
 
5.
8 
 
20
1.
9 
13
1.
1 
74
.4
 
29
.2
 
 
30
 
42
.1
 
27
.0
 
15
.0
 
5.
7 
 
21
0.
6 
13
4.
8 
75
.0
 
28
.5
 
 
To
ta
l 
1,
00
1.
6 
79
5.
1 
60
0.
6 
39
7.
0 
 
5,
00
7.
9 
3,
97
5.
6 
3,
00
2.
8 
1,
98
5.
1 
 
 
71 
 
Ta
bl
e 
A
.6
. B
en
ef
its
 o
f C
O
2 s
eq
ue
st
ra
tio
n 
pe
r h
ec
ta
re
 fo
r e
uc
al
yp
tu
s p
la
nt
at
io
ns
 d
is
co
un
te
d 
at
 1
.5
%
, 3
.5
%
, a
nd
 6
.9
%
 o
f t
he
 S
D
R 
 
 
Th
e 
SC
C
 a
t $
1/
tC
O
2 
 
Th
e 
SC
C
 a
t $
5/
tC
O
2 
 
Y
ea
r 
A
nn
ua
l 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l C
O
2 
be
ne
fit
s a
t S
C
C
 
of
 $
1/
tC
O
2, 
$ 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f 
C
O
2 b
en
ef
its
 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
at
 
1.
5%
, $
 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f 
C
O
2 b
en
ef
its
 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
at
 
3.
5%
, $
 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f 
C
O
2 b
en
ef
its
 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
at
 
6.
9%
, $
 
 
A
nn
ua
l 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l C
O
2 
be
ne
fit
s a
t S
C
C
 
of
 $
5/
tC
O
2, 
$ 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f 
C
O
2 b
en
ef
its
 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
at
 
1.
5%
, $
 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f 
C
O
2 b
en
ef
its
 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
at
 
3.
5%
, $
 
Pr
es
en
t v
al
ue
 o
f 
C
O
2 b
en
ef
its
 
di
sc
ou
nt
in
g 
at
 
6.
9%
, $
 
 
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
1 
12
.8
 
12
.6
 
12
.3
 
12
.0
 
 
63
.9
 
62
.9
 
61
.7
 
59
.8
 
 
2 
24
.3
 
23
.6
 
22
.7
 
21
.2
 
 
12
1.
4 
11
7.
8 
11
3.
3 
10
6.
2 
 
3 
32
.0
 
30
.6
 
28
.9
 
26
.2
 
 
16
0.
1 
15
3.
1 
14
4.
4 
13
1.
1 
 
4 
38
.4
 
36
.2
 
33
.4
 
29
.4
 
 
19
1.
9 
18
0.
8 
16
7.
2 
14
7.
0 
 
5 
43
.9
 
40
.8
 
37
.0
 
31
.5
 
 
21
9.
7 
20
3.
9 
18
4.
9 
15
7.
3 
 
6 
48
.9
 
44
.7
 
39
.8
 
32
.8
 
 
24
4.
7 
22
3.
7 
19
9.
0 
16
3.
9 
 
7 
53
.5
 
48
.2
 
42
.1
 
33
.5
 
 
26
7.
6 
24
1.
1 
21
0.
3 
16
7.
7 
 
8 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
9 
12
.8
 
11
.2
 
9.
4 
7.
0 
 
63
.9
 
55
.9
 
46
.9
 
35
.0
 
 
10
 
24
.3
 
20
.9
 
17
.2
 
12
.5
 
 
12
1.
4 
10
4.
6 
86
.0
 
62
.3
 
 
11
 
32
.0
 
27
.2
 
21
.9
 
15
.4
 
 
16
0.
1 
13
5.
9 
10
9.
7 
76
.8
 
 
12
 
38
.4
 
32
.1
 
25
.4
 
17
.2
 
 
19
1.
9 
16
0.
5 
12
7.
0 
86
.2
 
 
13
 
43
.9
 
36
.2
 
28
.1
 
18
.5
 
 
21
9.
7 
18
1.
0 
14
0.
5 
92
.3
 
 
14
 
48
.9
 
39
.7
 
30
.2
 
19
.2
 
 
24
4.
7 
19
8.
6 
15
1.
1 
96
.1
 
 
15
 
53
.5
 
42
.8
 
31
.9
 
19
.7
 
 
26
7.
6 
21
4.
0 
15
9.
7 
98
.4
 
 
16
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
17
 
12
.8
 
9.
9 
7.
1 
4.
1 
 
63
.9
 
49
.6
 
35
.6
 
20
.5
 
 
18
 
24
.3
 
18
.6
 
13
.1
 
7.
3 
 
12
1.
4 
92
.8
 
65
.3
 
36
.5
 
 
19
 
32
.0
 
24
.1
 
16
.7
 
9.
0 
 
16
0.
1 
12
0.
7 
83
.3
 
45
.1
 
 
20
 
38
.4
 
28
.5
 
19
.3
 
10
.1
 
 
19
1.
9 
14
2.
5 
96
.4
 
50
.5
 
 
21
 
43
.9
 
32
.1
 
21
.3
 
10
.8
 
 
21
9.
7 
16
0.
7 
10
6.
7 
54
.1
 
 
22
 
48
.9
 
35
.3
 
23
.0
 
11
.3
 
 
24
4.
7 
17
6.
3 
11
4.
8 
56
.4
 
 
23
 
53
.5
 
38
.0
 
24
.3
 
11
.5
 
 
26
7.
6 
19
0.
0 
12
1.
3 
57
.7
 
 
24
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
 
25
 
12
.8
 
8.
8 
5.
4 
2.
4 
 
63
.9
 
44
.0
 
27
.0
 
12
.0
 
 
26
 
24
.3
 
16
.5
 
9.
9 
4.
3 
 
12
1.
4 
82
.4
 
49
.6
 
21
.4
 
 
27
 
32
.0
 
21
.4
 
12
.6
 
5.
3 
 
16
0.
1 
10
7.
1 
63
.2
 
26
.4
 
 
28
 
38
.4
 
25
.3
 
14
.6
 
5.
9 
 
19
1.
9 
12
6.
5 
73
.2
 
29
.6
 
 
29
 
43
.9
 
28
.5
 
16
.2
 
6.
3 
 
21
9.
7 
14
2.
6 
81
.0
 
31
.7
 
 
30
 
48
.9
 
31
.3
 
17
.4
 
6.
6 
 
24
4.
7 
15
6.
5 
87
.2
 
33
.1
 
 
To
ta
l 
96
1.
8 
76
5.
2 
58
1.
3 
39
1.
0 
 
4,
80
9.
1 
3,
82
5.
8 
2,
90
6.
6 
1,
95
5.
2 
 
72 
A.2 Technical report – CO2 sequestration regression 
analysis 
Regression analysis for CO2 sequestration of teak and eucalyptus plantations was performed 
using Stata software. Data for analysis consisted of the CO2 sequestration and the stand age of 
trees. CO2 sequestration is the dependent variable, while the stand age is the independent 
variable. The CO2 sequestration (tCO2/ha) for teak and eucalyptus was converted from carbon 
pool stock (tC/ha) by multiplying with a unit convertor of 44/12 Carbon pool stock were gathered 
from literature and summarized in tables below. 
 
Table A.7. Carbon pool stock for teak plantations 
No Species Age (years) tC/ha Country Reference 
1 Tectona grandis 1 2.9 Panama (Derwisch et al., 2009) 
2 Tectona grandis 10 70.27 India (Reddy et al., 2014) 
3 Tectona grandis 10 40.7 Panama (Derwisch et al., 2009) 
4 Tectona grandis 15 108.53 India (Reddy et al., 2014) 
5 Tectona grandis 18 57.36 India (Banerjee & Prakasam, 2013) 
6 Tectona grandis 20 330 India (Reddy et al., 2014) 
7 Tectona grandis 20 351 Panama (Kraenzel et al., 2003) 
8 Tectona grandis 20 191.1 Panama (Derwisch et al., 2009) 
9 Tectona grandis 47 135.99 India (Banerjee & Prakasam, 2013) 
10 Tectona grandis 50 181.3 India (Sreejesh et al., 2013) with thinning 
 
Table A.8. Carbon pool stock for eucalyptus plantations 
No Type Age (years) tC/ha Country Reference 
1 E. urophylla x E. grandis 3 31.6 China (Du et al., 2015) 
2 E. tereticornis 3 11.9 India (Rawat & Negi, 2004) 
3 Eucatypus ep 3.6 27.7 Santa Maria (Wink et al., 2013) 
4 E. tereticornis 5 18.7 India (Kushalapa, 1993) 
5 E. tereticornis 6 28.2 India (Kushalapa, 1993) 
6 E urophylla x E. grandis 6 to 8 70.1 China (Du et al., 2015) 
7 Eucalyptus tereticornis 7 64 India Sankaran (1999,2000)  
in (Yamada et al., 2004) 
8 Eucalyptus tereticornis 9 146 India (Rawat & Negi, 2004) 
9 Eucalyptus tereticornis 10 108 India (Prasad et al., 1998) 
10 Eucatypus occidentalis 26 53.3 Australia (Harper et al., 2012) 
 
Two mathematical models were analyzed: the log-log model and the quadratic model (see Table 
A.9). These mathematical models are suitable for having a zero intercept, as trees do not sequestrate 
CO2 when the stand age is zero.  
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Table A.9. Economic models for regression 
Model Economical model 
Log-log model ln𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = b0 + b1 ln𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 
Quadratic model with a constraint 
suppressed to zero 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = b1𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒2 
 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 is CO2 sequestration (tCO2/ha); ln𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 is a natural log form of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠; 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 
is a stand age of tree (years); ln𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 is a natural logarithm form of 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒; b0 is a constant 
coefficient, and b1 and b2 are the coefficients of the dependent variables. A zero constant is set 
for the quadratic model to represent zero growth at the stand age of zero. Meanwhile, the log-log 
model will result in the zero intersect after back-transformation. Smearing retransformation is 
used for the back-transformation of the log-log model (Duan, 1983). There are two 
retransformation equations, as shown in Table A.10. It is based on normality and 
homoscedasticity of the error term. 
 
Table A.10.  Smearing retransformation (Duan, 1983)  
Condition for error term Retransformation 
Normally distributed and homoscedastic 𝐿𝐿(𝐸𝐸|𝑥𝑥0) = exp(𝜇𝜇) exp �
1
2
𝜎𝜎2� 
Not normally distributed but homoscedastic 𝐿𝐿(𝐸𝐸|𝑥𝑥0) = exp(𝜇𝜇) E(exp(ε)) 
 
where 𝐿𝐿(𝐸𝐸|𝑥𝑥0) is expected value of y given 𝑥𝑥0; 𝜇𝜇 is a mean value which is calculated from b0 +
b1 ln𝑥𝑥0; 𝜎𝜎2 is the variance of error or mean squared error (MSE), and ε is the error term. 
Note that the sample size for both teak and eucalyptus plantations is small, with eight 
observations for teak and ten for eucalyptus. However, there are enough degrees of freedom to 
estimate regression analysis with a high significance level. 
A.2.1 Regression results for teak plantations 
Results from regression analysis for CO2 sequestration of teak plantations are shown in the table 
below. To evaluate if a regression is a good-fitting model, three metrics are widely used. The first 
metric is R-squared, which is a statistical measure of fit to indicate how well the regression is 
explained by the independent variable. It ranges from 0 to 1; 1 denotes 100% of regression is 
explained by the independent variable(s). The second is the f-test of overall significance, which 
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represents the statistical significance of the overall relationship between dependent variable and 
independent variable(s). To interpret the value of the f-test, the probability value or p-value of 
statistical hypothesis testing is often used. When a p-value for the f-test is less than 0.05, it means 
that sample data provide sufficient evidence to conclude that a regression model fits the data with 
a 95% significance level. Lastly, RMSE is a measure of the closeness of a regression line to 
sample points. It is a suitable metric to compare different functional forms. Lower values of 
RMSE mean that the regression line is close to sample points, indicating a better-fit estimator.  
 
For the significance of the individual coefficient, the Student’s T-test or t-test is applied by 
looking at a p-value for the t-test from regression results. When a p-value for the t-test is less than 
0.05, it indicates that the individual coefficient from the regression model is significant at a 95% 
significance level.  
 
The regression results of the two models show very similar values in terms of p-values for the t-
test and the f-test, and the R-squared, except the RMSE. P-values for the t-test for coefficients are 
less than 0.05. The R-squared is greater than 0.85, though it cannot be directly compared due to 
different functional forms of estimators. However, the RMSE for the quadratic model is much 
lower compared to the log-log model. Therefore, the log-log model is selected. 
 
Table A.11. Summary of regression results for CO2 sequestration for teak plantations 
Model Coefficient p-value  
for t-test  
R-
squared 
p-value  
for F-test 
RMSE 
ln𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = b0 + b1 ln𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 b0 = 2.2202 
b1 = 1.4227 
0.008 
0.001 
0.87 0.0006 0.5892 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = b1𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒2 b1 = 2.2535 0.000 0.85 0.0004 286.16 
 
The selected model was also checked for normality, heteroscedasticity, non-linearity, and model 
specification (see Table A.13 and section A.2.4 for the results of regression diagnostics). It shows 
that the selected model is an unbiased estimator. The error term, which is the difference between 
sample data and the predicted value, is normally distributed and homoscedastic. Therefore, 
retransformation was done as follows.  
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ln𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = (2.2203 + 1.4228 ∗ ln𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = exp (2.2203 + 1.4228 ∗ ln𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒)exp(0.5 𝜎𝜎2) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = exp(2.2203 + 0.5 ∗ 0.3473 ) ∗ exp (1.4228 ∗ ln𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 10.9567 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒1.4228 
 
where 𝜎𝜎2 = (𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿)2 = (0.5892)2 = 0.3473, CO2seq is CO2 sequestration (tCO2/ha) and Age 
is stand age (years).  
 
 
Figure A.1. CO2 sequestration potential for teak plantations 
 
A.2.2 Regression results for eucalyptus plantations 
In the case of eucalyptus, it yields to the same model, which is the log-log model. The p-values for 
the t-test and the f-test are lower than 0.05 for both models, indicating statistically significant with 
a 95% confidence level. While the R-squared of the quadratic model is higher than that of the log-
log model, however, the selection is more suitable on the basis of lower RMSE. The table below 
shows the regression results for eucalyptus plantations.  
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Table A.12. Summary of regression results for CO2 sequestration for eucalyptus plantations 
Model Coefficient p-value  
for t-test  
R-
squared 
p-value  
for F-test 
RMSE 
ln𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = b0 + b1 ln𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 b0 = 2.4420 
b1 = 1.5361 
0.004 
0.002 
0.70 0.0023 0.4594 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = b1𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒2 b1 = 4.8243 0.000 0.92 0.0000 76.315 
 
The log-log model for eucalyptus is also an unbiased estimator based on tests for normality, 
heteroscedasticity, non-linearity, and model specification (see Table A.14 and section A.2.4 for the 
results of regression diagnostics). The error term is normally distributed and homoscedastic. 
Retransformation was done with the results as follows. 
 
ln𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = (2.4420 + 1.5361 ∗ ln𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = exp (2.4420 + 1.5361 ∗ ln𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒)exp(0.5 𝜎𝜎2) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = exp(2.4420 + 0.5 ∗ 0.2110) ∗ exp (1.5361 ∗ ln𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 12.7761 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒1.5361 
 
where 𝜎𝜎2 = (𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿)2 = (0.4594)2 = 0.2110, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 is CO2 sequestration (tCO2/ha) and 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 
is stand age (years). 
 
Figure A.2. CO2 sequestration potential for eucalyptus plantations  
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A.2.3 STATA code for regression analysis  
Using regression function in STATA, the results of regression analysis of CO2 sequestration 
potentials were obtained. Given the S-shape yield curve of tree plantations, the non-linear form is 
expected for this regression. Further, omitting of outliers was done to improve the regression 
results. Regression diagnostic tests were done to ensure that the regression results are an unbiased 
estimator. The steps are summarized as follows. Graphical diagnostic results are in section A.2.4. 
Procedure Method and STATA command 
Before running regression  
Summary statistics Command: summarize variable_names 
Check correlation Method: Pearson’s Correlation 
Command: corr variable_names     
Tests for normality of data Method: Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality 
Command: swilk variable_names     
After running regression  
Tests for normality of 
residuals 
Method: Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality 
Command swilk residual 
 Method: Kernel density plot with normal distribution overlayed 
Command: kdensity residual, normal 
 Method: Standardized normal probability (P-P) plot 
Command: pnorm residual 
 Method: Plots the quantiles of variable_name against the quantiles of a normal 
distribution 
Command: qnorm residual 
Tests for heteroscedasticity Method: Cook and Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity. 
Command: estat imtest 
 Method: White general test for Heteroscedasticity 
Command: estat hettest 
Tests for multicollinearity Method: Variance inflation factor 
Command: vif 
Tests for non-linearity Method: plot residual with independent variable 
Command: scatter residual independent_variable, yline(0) 
 Method: Graphs an augmented component-plus-residual plot 
Command: acprplot independent_variable, lowess 
 Method: Graphs component-plus-residual plot 
Command: cprplot independent_variable, lowess 
Tests for model specification Method: Link test for model specification 
Command: linktest 
 Method: Ramsey’s regression specification error test (RESET) for omitted variables 
Command: ovtest 
 
Below box shows STATA codes and results of regression analysis. 
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Table A.13. Regression analysis using STATA for teak plantations 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
File: teak-regression.log 
Analyst: Vongdalone Vongsikeo 
Date: 3/11/2020 
Variables: CO2seq as carbon dioxide sequestration potential (tCO2/ha) and Age as stand 
age of tree (years) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
================================ Function: log-log form =============================== 
//summary statistics of data 
 
. sum CO2seq Age 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
      CO2seq |          8    527.9358    488.8885   10.63333       1287 
         Age |          8       14.25    6.819091          1         20 
 
//Check correlation coefficient. The results show a high correlation. 
 
. corr CO2seq ln_CO2seq Age ln_Age 
(obs=8) 
 
             |   CO2seq ln_CO2~q      Age   ln_Age 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
      CO2seq |   1.0000 
   ln_CO2seq |   0.8179   1.0000 
         Age |   0.7543   0.9249   1.0000 
      ln_Age |   0.5974   0.9352   0.9304   1.0000 
 
//perform Shapiro-Wilk W test to check the normality of data. "ln_" denotes natural log 
//form. If Prob>z is less than 0.05, it means that the data is normally distributed at 
//a 95% confidence level. The results show that Age and ln_Age have low p-values. Age 
//and ln_Age is not normally distributed. 
 
. swilk CO2seq ln_CO2seq Age ln_Age 
 
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
 
    Variable |        Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
      CO2seq |          8    0.86298      1.909     1.133    0.12855 
   ln_CO2seq |          8    0.86865      1.830     1.053    0.14620 
         Age |          8    0.83104      2.354     1.548    0.06086 
      ln_Age |          8    0.50765      6.859     4.210    0.00001 
 
//log-log form: ln_CO2sseq = Coefficient0 + Coefficient1 * ln_Age. 
 
. reg ln_CO2seq ln_Age 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =         8 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 6)         =     41.85 
       Model |  14.5328467         1  14.5328467   Prob > F        =    0.0006 
    Residual |  2.08358582         6  .347264303   R-squared       =    0.8746 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.8537 
       Total |  16.6164325         7  2.37377607   Root MSE        =    .58929 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   ln_CO2seq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ln_Age |   1.422797   .2199366     6.47   0.001      .884631    1.960962 
       _cons |   2.220251   .5672426     3.91   0.008     .8322586    3.608244 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
//store residual and fitted values 
 
. predict r_ln, residual 
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. predict y_ln 
(option xb assumed; fitted values) 
 
//Perform Shapiro-Wilk W test to check normality of residuals. If Prob>z is less than 
//0.05, it means that the residuals are normally distributed at a 95% confidence level. 
//The results show that high p-values. Therefore, the residuals are normally 
//distributed. 
 
. swilk r_ln 
 
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
 
    Variable |        Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
        r_ln |          8    0.93608      0.890    -0.184    0.57296 
 
 
//Kernel density plot with normal distribution overlayed. 
 
. kdensity r_ln, normal 
(n() set to 8) 
 
//Standardized normal probability (P-P) plot. 
//pnorm is sensitive to non-normality in the middle range of data. 
 
. pnorm r_ln 
 
//Plots the quantiles of variable_name against the quantiles of a normal distribution 
//qnorm is sensitive to non-normality near the tails. 
 
. qnorm r_ln 
 
//perform Cook and Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis is the 
//variance of the residuals is homogeneous. The null hypothesis is not rejected; the 
//variance of the residuals is homogeneous. 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |       1.67      2    0.4340 
            Skewness |       1.26      1    0.2613 
            Kurtosis |       0.17      1    0.6786 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |       3.10      4    0.5407 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
//perform Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
//The null hypothesis is that the variance of the residuals is homogeneous. Not reject 
//the null hypothesis, the variance of the residuals is homogeneous. 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of ln_CO2seq 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.85 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.3573 
 
//vif to check for multicollinearity. There is only one independent variable, no 
//multicollinearity. If VIF values are greater than 10, further investigation is 
//required. 
 
. vif 
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    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      ln_Age |      1.00    1.000000 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.00 
 
//scatter plot of the residuals and independent variables to test for non-linearity. 
 
. scatter r_ln ln_Age, yline(0) 
 
//perform an augmented component-plus-residual plot to test for non-linearity. 
 
. acprplot ln_Age, lowess 
 
//perform a component-plus-residual plot to test for non-linearity. 
 
. cprplot ln_Age, lowess 
 
//perform a link test for model specification. 
//p-value is greater than 0.05. it means there is no specification error. 
 
. linktest 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =         8 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(2, 5)         =     21.08 
       Model |  14.8547051         2  7.42735254   Prob > F        =    0.0037 
    Residual |  1.76172743         5  .352345485   R-squared       =    0.8940 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.8516 
       Total |  16.6164325         7  2.37377607   Root MSE        =    .59359 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   ln_CO2seq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |  -.2996942   1.368742    -0.22   0.835    -3.818159     3.21877 
      _hatsq |   .1496255   .1565517     0.96   0.383    -.2528034    .5520545 
       _cons |    2.30152   2.571415     0.90   0.412    -4.308513    8.911553 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
//perform a Ramsey RESET test for model specification and omitted variables. 
//p-value is greater than 0.05; it means there is no specification error. 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of ln_CO2seq 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 3) =      4.58 
                  Prob > F =      0.1215 
 
=============================== Function: Quadratic form ============================== 
 
//regression with a constant suppressed to zero 
//Age2 means Age to the power two, Age3 means Age to the power three 
 
. regress CO2seq Age Age2 Age3, nocons 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =         8 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(3, 5)         =     15.10 
       Model |  3514840.97         3  1171613.66   Prob > F        =    0.0061 
    Residual |  387972.537         5  77594.5073   R-squared       =    0.9006 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.8409 
       Total |   3902813.5         8  487851.688   Root MSE        =    278.56 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      CO2seq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Age |   167.3246   146.4873     1.14   0.305    -209.2329    543.8821 
        Age2 |  -23.54513   20.04694    -1.17   0.293    -75.07742    27.98717 
        Age3 |   .8854186   .6491603     1.36   0.231     -.783301    2.554138 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. regress CO2seq Age2, nocons 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =         8 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 7)         =     40.66 
       Model |  3329595.88         1  3329595.88   Prob > F        =    0.0004 
    Residual |  573217.625         7  81888.2322   R-squared       =    0.8531 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.8321 
       Total |   3902813.5         8  487851.688   Root MSE        =    286.16 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      CO2seq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Age2 |   2.253594   .3534196     6.38   0.000     1.417889    3.089298 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
// F-test for the exclusion restriction. 
// Null hypothesis is that the coefficient of Age and Age3 = 0 
// sum of squared error for the restricted model, SSRr= 573217.625 
// sum of squared error for the unrestricted model, SSRur = 387972.537 
// number of restrictions, q = 2 
// degrees of freedom in the unrestricted model, n - k - 1 = 5 
// F-test = [(SSRr - SSRur)/q] / [SSRur/(n-k-1)] 
//        = [(573217.625 - 387972.537)/2] / [387972.537/5] 
//        = 1.67 
// F-critical value, F-cr(0.05,2,5) = 5.78 
// F-test < F-cr.  
// Null hypothesis is not rejected. Therefore, Coeff-Age = Coeff-Age3 = 0 
 
//to choose between log-log form and quadratic form, the Root MSE is very important. 
//The smaller the root MSE, the better the estimator. The quadratic model has a much 
//higher root MSE than that the log-log model. No further test is required. 
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Table A.14. Regression analysis using STATA for eucalyptus plantations 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
File: eucalyptus-regression.log 
Analyst: Vongdalone Vongsikeo 
Date: 3/11/2020 
Variables: CO2seq as carbon dioxide sequestration potential (tCO2/ha) and Age as stand 
age of tree (years) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
================================ Function: log-log form =============================== 
 
. sum CO2seq Age 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
      CO2seq |         10      211.31     158.155   43.63333   535.3333 
         Age |         10        6.06    2.465856          3         10 
 
. corr CO2seq ln_CO2seq Age ln_Age 
(obs=10) 
 
             |   CO2seq ln_CO2~q      Age   ln_Age 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
      CO2seq |   1.0000 
   ln_CO2seq |   0.9445   1.0000 
         Age |   0.8607   0.8645   1.0000 
      ln_Age |   0.8112   0.8414   0.9852   1.0000 
 
. swilk CO2seq ln_CO2seq Age ln_Age 
 
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
 
    Variable |        Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
      CO2seq |         10    0.89073      1.684     0.943    0.17282 
   ln_CO2seq |         10    0.96224      0.582    -0.882    0.81105 
         Age |         10    0.94134      0.904    -0.171    0.56803 
      ln_Age |         10    0.92137      1.212     0.336    0.36849 
 
. reg ln_CO2seq ln_Age 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        10 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 8)         =     19.39 
       Model |  4.09401115         1  4.09401115   Prob > F        =    0.0023 
    Residual |  1.68884928         8   .21110616   R-squared       =    0.7080 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.6715 
       Total |  5.78286043         9  .642540048   Root MSE        =    .45946 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   ln_CO2seq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ln_Age |    1.53615   .3488267     4.40   0.002     .7317547    2.340546 
       _cons |    2.44202   .6171978     3.96   0.004      1.01876    3.865281 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. predict r_ln, res 
 
. predict y_ln 
(option xb assumed; fitted values) 
 
. swilk r_ln 
 
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
 
    Variable |        Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
        r_ln |         10    0.96512      0.538    -1.004    0.84229 
. kdensity r_ln, normal 
(n() set to 10) 
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. pnorm r_ln 
 
. qnorm r_ln 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |       2.02      2    0.3648 
            Skewness |       0.43      1    0.5117 
            Kurtosis |       0.92      1    0.3370 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |       3.37      4    0.4980 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of ln_CO2seq 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.64 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.4226 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      ln_Age |      1.00    1.000000 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.00 
 
. scatter r_ln ln_Age, yline(0) 
 
. acprplot ln_Age, lowess 
 
. cprplot ln_Age, lowess 
 
. linktest 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        10 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(2, 7)         =     10.79 
       Model |  4.36612837         2  2.18306418   Prob > F        =    0.0073 
    Residual |  1.41673207         7  .202390295   R-squared       =    0.7550 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.6850 
       Total |  5.78286043         9  .642540048   Root MSE        =    .44988 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   ln_CO2seq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |  -3.965688   4.288258    -0.92   0.386    -14.10581    6.174431 
      _hatsq |   .4970044   .4286247     1.16   0.284    -.5165319    1.510541 
       _cons |   12.19602   10.57956     1.15   0.287    -12.82066     37.2127 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of ln_CO2seq 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 5) =      0.66 
                  Prob > F =      0.6098 
 
=============================== Function: Quadratic form ============================== 
 
//regression with an assumption of zero constant 
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. reg CO2seq Age Age2 Age3, nocons 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        10 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(3, 7)         =     28.34 
       Model |  620552.624         3  206850.875   Prob > F        =    0.0003 
    Residual |  51083.5553         7  7297.65075   R-squared       =    0.9239 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.8913 
       Total |  671636.179        10  67163.6179   Root MSE        =    85.426 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      CO2seq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Age |   9.729099   47.05172     0.21   0.842    -101.5305    120.9887 
        Age2 |   3.112656    13.8752     0.22   0.829    -29.69699     35.9223 
        Age3 |   .0613065   .9724873     0.06   0.951     -2.23826    2.360873 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. reg CO2seq Age2, nocons 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        10 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 9)         =    106.32 
       Model |  619220.253         1  619220.253   Prob > F        =    0.0000 
    Residual |  52415.9258         9  5823.99175   R-squared       =    0.9220 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.9133 
       Total |  671636.179        10  67163.6179   Root MSE        =    76.315 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      CO2seq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Age2 |   4.824377   .4678742    10.31   0.000     3.765972    5.882782 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
// F-test for exclusion restriction. 
// Null hypothesis is coefficient of Age and Age3 = 0 
// sum of squared error for restricted model, SSRr= 52415.9258 
// sum of squared error for unrestricted model, SSRur = 51083.5553 
// number of restrictions, q = 2 
// degrees of freedom in the unrestricted model, n - k - 1 = 7 
// F-test = [(SSRr - SSRur)/q] / [SSRur/(n-k-1)] 
//        = [(52415.9258 - 51083.5553)/2] / [51083.5553/7] 
//        = 0.091 
// F-critical value, F-cr(0.05,2,7) = 4.74 
// F-test < F-cr.  
// Null hypothesis is not rejected. Therefore, Coeff-Age = Coeff-Age3 = 0 
 
//The quadratic model has a much higher root MSE than that of the log-log model.  
//No further test is required. 
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A.2.4 Regression diagnostics with graphs 
Regression diagnostics with graphs for CO2 sequestration of teak and eucalyptus plantations are 
shown here. The results show that overfitting is observed, particularly for data on teak. There is a 
minor non-linearity issue (see cprplot plots below). However, residuals are random with a normal 
distribution. It can be graphically concluded that the regression results are unbiased estimators. 
Teak Eucalyptus 
Scatter plot of CO2seq and Age 
  
Scatter plot of observations and predicted value 
  
Scatter plot of fitted value and residual  
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Teak Eucalyptus 
Scatter plot of residual and independent variable 
  
Kennel density plot of residuals  
  
pnorm - Standardized normal probability (P-P) plot 
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Teak Eucalyptus 
qnorm - Plots the quantiles of variable_name against the quantiles of a normal distribution 
  
cprplot - Graphs component-plus-residual plot  
  
 
 
 
  
 
88 
A.3 Statistical data 
Table A.15. Macroeconomic data 
Year Consumer 
price index 
(CPI) 
Nominal GDP 
per cap (1,000 
LAK) 
Real GDP per 
cap (1,000 LAK) 
CPI Inflation 
rate (%) 
Real GDP per 
cap growth rate 
(%) 
2009 74.78 7,724  8,186  - - 
2010 79.25 8,906  8,906  5.98 8.8 
2011 85.26 10,141  9,426  7.58 5.8 
2012 88.89 11,551  10,299  4.26 9.3 
2013 94.55 12,733  10,672  6.37 3.6 
2014 98.46 14,005  11,273  4.13 5.6 
2015 99.71 18,060  14,354  1.28 27.3 
2016 101.3 19,577  15,316  1.6 6.7 
2017 102.14 20,354  15,792  0.83 3.1 
2018 104.23 21,732  16,524  2.04 4.6 
2019 107.69 - - 3.32 - 
Average    3.74% 5.9%* 
Source: Lao Statistics Bureau (2019) and BOL (n.d.) *excluded data in the year 2015; LAK means 
Lao Kip currency.  
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A.4 Formula sheet 
List of symbols 
NPV  Net present value ($) 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 Net future value ($) 
PV Present value ($) 
FV Future value ($) 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  Revenues at time t ($) 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  Costs at time t ($) 
𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡   Benefits from CO2 sequestration at time t ($) 
r  Real interest rate (%) 
IRR Internal rate of return (%) 
SDR Social discount rate (%) 
Δt  difference in number of years (year) 
t  Number of year (year) 
T  Total time period (years) 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡  Consumer price index at time t 
𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  Nominal GDP per capita at time t (local currency) 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  Real GDP per capita at time t (local currency) 
𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  Benefits at time t or benefits of CO2 sequestration ($) 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 Costs at time t ($) 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 Revenues at time t ($) 
𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 Cash flow at time t ($) 
LEV  Land expectation value ($) 
MAI Mean annual increment (m3/ha/year)  
Age Stand age of tree (year) 
SRTP Social rate of time preference (%) 
𝜌𝜌 Pure time preference rate (%) 
e  Elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption  
g  Real GDP per capita growth rate (%) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 CO2 sequestration potential (tCO2/ha) 
SCC Social cost of carbon ($/tCO2) 
α, β Estimated parameter from regression analysis 
Yield Timber yield (m3/ha) 
Price timber price ($/m3)  
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Table A.16. List of formula used in this study 
No. Parameter Unit Formula 
1 CPI inflation rate % 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1
 
2 Real GDP per capita in a base year 
Local 
currency 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
 
3 Real GDP per capita growth rate % 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−1
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−1
 
4 Real interest rate % 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 − 𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁 𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 
5 Value at time t2 $ 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡1 ∗ (1 + 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁 𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒)
𝑡𝑡2−𝑡𝑡1 
6 Present value $ 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡
 
7 Net present value $ �
𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡
 
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=0
−�
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=0
 
8 New future value $ 𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁 ∗ (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 
9 Land expectation value $ 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 − 1
 
10 Internal rate of returns % �
𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡
(1 + 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑡𝑡
 
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1
− 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁0 = 0 
Solve for IRR 
11 
Social rate of time 
preference (Ramsey’s 
equation) 
% 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝜌𝜌 + 𝑒𝑒 ∗ 𝑔𝑔 
12 Timber yield m3/ha 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 
13 Timber income $ 𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 
14 CO2 sequestration tCO2/ha α ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽 
15 Benefits of CO2 sequestration $ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 ∗  𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
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A.5 Supplements 
Table A.17. Effects of rotation age on the total and the average CO2 sequestration. 
 Concession year Total, tCO2/ha 
Average, 
tCO2/ha/year 
Rotation 
(years) 0 1 2 3 4 5 7-26 27 28 29 30 
  
Teak 
1 0 11 0 11 0 11 …. 11 0 11 0 164 5.5 
2 0 11 18.4 0 11 18.4 …. 0 11 18.4 0 294 9.8 
3 0 11 18.4 22.9 0 11 …. 22.9 0 11 18.4 395 13.2 
4 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 0 …. 18.4 22.9 26.5 0 473 15.8 
5 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 22.9 26.5 29.4 0 541 18.0 
6 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 32 0 11 18.4 590 19.7 
7 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 22.9 26.5 29.4 32 664 22.1 
8 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 0 11 18.4 22.9 686 22.9 
9 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 34.4 36.5 38.5 0 749 25.0 
10 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 29.4 32 34.4 36.5 791 26.4 
11 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 22.9 26.5 29.4 32 805 26.8 
12 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 831 27.7 
13 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 45.3 0 11 18.4 872 29.1 
14 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 43.8 45.3 46.8 0 936 31.2 
15 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 42.1 43.8 45.3 46.8 985 32.8 
16 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 40.4 42.1 43.8 45.3 987 32.9 
17 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 38.5 40.4 42.1 43.8 993 33.1 
18 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 36.5 38.5 40.4 42.1 1002 33.4 
19 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 34.4 36.5 38.5 40.4 1013 33.8 
20 0 11 18.4 22.9 26.5 29.4 …. 32 34.4 36.5 38.5 1027 34.2 
Eucalyptus 
3 0 12.8 24.3 32 0 12.8 …. 32 0 12.8 24.3 521 17.4 
4 0 12.8 24.3 32 38.4 0 …. 24.3 32 38.4 0 645 21.5 
5 0 12.8 24.3 32 38.4 43.9 …. 32 38.4 43.9 0 757 25.2 
6 0 12.8 24.3 32 38.4 43.9 …. 48.9 0 12.8 24.3 838 27.9 
7 0 12.8 24.3 32 38.4 43.9 …. 32 38.4 43.9 48.9 962 32.1 
8 0 12.8 24.3 32 38.4 43.9 …. 0 12.8 24.3 32 1004 33.5 
9 0 12.8 24.3 32 38.4 43.9 …. 53.5 57.8 61.8 0 1120 37.3 
10 0 12.8 24.3 32 38.4 43.9 …. 43.9 48.9 53.5 57.8 1190 39.7 
 
By using CO2 sequestration presented in section 0, CO2 sequestration potentials for a range of 
stand age are obtained. The table above represents the change of CO2 sequestration potentials for 
each year using ΔCO2seq = CO2seqcurrent year – CO2seqprevious year. 
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Figure A.3. Comparisons between this study and previous studies. Gray box denotes the benefits 
of non-market value for tree plantations. Net present values are reported in 2020. 
 
 
Figure A.4. State investments decision rules (Warner, 2013) 
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Figure A.5. Relationship of yield, mean annual increment, and biological rotation age 
 
Table A.18. Non-market net present values (NPV) in 2020 dollars for different social cost of 
carbon (SCC) and social discount rate (SDR) 
Plantations SCC  SDR  
  1.5% 3.5% 6.9% 
Teak $1/tCO2 $795 $601 $397 
 $5/tCO2 $3,976 $3,003 $1,985 
Eucalyptus $1/tCO2 $765 $581 $391 
 $5/tCO2 $3,826 $2,907 $1,955 
Average $1/tCO2 $780 $591 $394 
 $5/tCO2 $3,901 $2,955 $1,970 
 
